Helpful to a Fault: Measuring Illicit Assistance in Multi-Turn, Multilingual LLM Agents
arXiv:2602. 16346v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: LLM-based agents execute real-world workflows via tools and memory.
arXiv:2510. 17947v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are improving at an exceptional rate.
arXiv:2602. 16346v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: LLM-based agents execute real-world workflows via tools and memory.
arXiv:2602. 13379v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: LLM-based agents are becoming increasingly capable, yet their safety lags behind.
arXiv:2606. 11425v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Jailbreak attacks expose persistent safety weaknesses in large language models (LLMs), but existing stateless single-turn methods face a trade-off: hand-crafted prompts are expressive but static, while iterative prompt optimization can adapt but often relies on low-level mutations that require many target queries.
arXiv:2606. 01738v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multi-turn jailbreak attacks pose a growing threat to LLMs by exploiting conversational dynamics such as gradual escalation and cross-turn coordination.
arXiv:2608. 16465v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Automated red-teaming has produced a growing collection of attack strategies, yet they typically remain scattered across prompts and workflows, making them difficult to systematically integrate, reuse, and improve at scale.
arXiv:2606. 20470v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic AI systems increasingly rely on language-model components to interpret instructions, process external data, invoke tools, and coordinate with other agents.
arXiv:2507. 22063v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) for code generation (i.
arXiv:2608. 15594v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Multi-turn jailbreak attacks have emerged as a critical safety threat to LLMs, as harmful objectives are decomposed across a sequence of apparently benign turns to bypass guardrails.
arXiv:2511. 19517v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Multi-turn conversational attacks, which leverage psychological principles like Foot-in-the-Door (FITD), where a small initial request paves the way for a more significant one, to bypass safety alignments, pose a persistent threat to Large Language Models (LLMs).
arXiv:2605. 06605v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Evaluating and predicting the performance of large language models (LLMs) in multi-turn conversational settings is critical yet computationally expensive; key events -- e.
arXiv:2607. 11698v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Production LLM agents such as Claude Code and Codex operate over untrusted content, files, commands, and workspace state, making safety failures directly actionable.
arXiv:2509. 25624v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As LLMs advance into autonomous agents with tool-use capabilities, they introduce security challenges that extend beyond traditional content-based LLM safety concerns.