arXiv:2602. 20213v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The evaluation of Large Language Models (LLMs) for code generation relies heavily on the quality and robustness of test cases.
By Jingwei Shi, Xinxiang Yin, Jing Huang, Jinman Zhao, Shengyu Tao
arXiv:2608. 10171v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has facilitated their ubiquitous integration into various domains, leading to widespread adoption.
By Berkay Ozcam, Irem Onen, Mehmet Fatih Amasyali, Emin Islam Tatli
arXiv:2606. 12737v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are rapidly evolving into agentic systems that interact with external tools and environments, introducing new security risks such as indirect prompt injection attacks through untrusted external sources.
By Pengfei He, Lesly Miculicich, Vishesh Sharma, Ash Fox, George Lee, Jiliang Tang, Tomas Pfister, Long T. Le
arXiv:2607. 11698v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Production LLM agents such as Claude Code and Codex operate over untrusted content, files, commands, and workspace state, making safety failures directly actionable.
By Xutao Mao, Xiang Zheng, Cong Wang
arXiv:2606. 23927v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agentic AI systems powered by large language models (LLMs) are rapidly evolving into autonomous decision-making systems, exposing attack vectors beyond those of traditional LLM vulnerabilities.
By Yarin Yerushalmi Levi, Roy Betser, Amit Giloni, Lidor Erez, Itay Gershon, Oren Rachmil, Sindhu Padakandla, Roman Vainshtein
The paper introduces a black-box framework for evaluating agentic AI systems, focusing on multi-step vulnerabilities that standard single-turn tests miss. It presents a seven-domain taxonomy linking observable behaviors to risk categories, an automated SAGE-RT red-teaming process generating 120 adversarial scenarios per domain, and a human-validated evaluation using LLM judges. Empirical tests on CrewAI and AutoGen agents show significant governance, privacy, and behavior risks, demonstrating the framework’s ability to uncover critical architectural weaknesses without privileged access.
By Divyanshu Kumar, Nitin Aravind Birur, Tanay Baswa, Sahil Agarwal, Prashanth Harshangi
arXiv:2510. 17947v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are improving at an exceptional rate.
By Neeladri Bhuiya, Madhav Aggarwal, Diptanshu Purwar
arXiv:2506. 07121v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Ensuring the safety and robustness of large language models (LLMs) is a fundamental challenge and a critical prerequisite for the responsible deployment of artificial intelligence.
By Ren-Jian Wang, Ke Xue, Zeyu Qin, Ziniu Li, Sheng Tang, Hao-Tian Li, Shengcai Liu, Zhi Yu, Yuanpeng Tan, Chao Qian
Production LLM agents such as Claude Code and Codex operate over untrusted content, files, commands, and workspace state, making safety failures directly actionable. Red-teaming must therefore keep pace with evolving models and tools.
arXiv:2608. 10669v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents combine language-based reasoning with external tools to perform complex tasks.
By Zixing Chen, Xingyuan Liu, Jie Zhu, Huaixia Dou, Shuo Jiang, Junhui Li, Lifan Guo, Feng Chen, Chi Zhang
arXiv:2606. 25476v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across natural language processing tasks, yet their deployment in high-stakes applications raises critical concerns regarding reliability, safety, and trustworthiness.
By Abrar Alotaibi, Raed Mughus, Moataz Ahmed
The paper introduces T-MAP, a trajectory‑aware evolutionary search technique designed to red‑team large language model agents by exploiting vulnerabilities that arise during multi‑step tool execution. Unlike traditional methods that focus on harmful text, T‑MAP uses execution trajectories to generate adversarial prompts that bypass safety guardrails and achieve harmful objectives through actual tool interactions. Experiments across various Model Context Protocol environments show that T‑MAP outperforms baseline methods in attack realization rate and remains effective against advanced models such as GPT‑5.2, Gemini‑3‑Pro, Qwen3.5, and GLM‑5.
By Hyomin Lee, Sangwoo Park, Yumin Choi, Sohyun An, Seanie Lee, Sung Ju Hwang