arXiv AI

Automating Deception: Scalable Multi-Turn LLM Jailbreaks

arXiv:2511. 19517v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Multi-turn conversational attacks, which leverage psychological principles like Foot-in-the-Door (FITD), where a small initial request paves the way for a more significant one, to bypass safety alignments, pose a persistent threat to Large Language Models (LLMs).

arXiv AI
Jul 28

Do LLMs Know Their Vulnerable Scenarios?

arXiv:2607. 23496v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety-aligned large language models are trained to refuse harmful requests, yet embedding the same requests in particular scenarios can bypass their safeguards.

By Ziheng Peng, Huiqi Deng, Haoran Jing, Xuankun Rong, Jiahui Han, Xiting Wang, Na Zou, Xia Hu
Hugging Face Trending Papers
Jul 26

Do LLMs Know Their Vulnerable Scenarios?

Safety-aligned large language models are trained to refuse harmful requests, yet embedding the same requests in particular scenarios can bypass their safeguards. Existing red-teaming methods empirically identify effective scenarios through observed attack outcomes, but why particular scenarios weaken refusal remains mechanistically unclear.

arXiv AI
Aug 6

Temporal Context Awareness: A Defense Framework Against Multi-turn Manipulation Attacks on Large Language Models

arXiv:2503. 15560v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly vulnerable to sophisticated multi-turn manipulation attacks, where adversaries strategically build context through seemingly benign conversational turns to circumvent safety measures and elicit harmful or unauthorized responses.

By Prashant Kulkarni, Assaf Namer