arXiv:2606. 02965v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: As large language models gain tool access and are deployed as autonomous agents capable of editing records, executing transactions, and modifying infrastructure, we still evaluate them based on the sole metric of task completion.
AgentAudit is an open, extensible framework that evaluates the full lifecycle of AI agents, assessing planning, tool selection, execution, memory, and reasoning across ten dimensions such as instruction integrity, security, and alignment. Unlike existing benchmarks that focus on single aspects, AgentAudit analyzes the entire execution trace to attribute failures to specific stages. The framework was tested on five large language models, revealing significant differences in trustworthiness even among models with similar task‑completion performance.
arXiv:2609.14758v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-augmented language models are evaluated on whether they reach the right answer, not on whether they report honestly when a tool fails to supply...
arXiv:2606. 02965v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Benchmarks for autonomous agents measure whether agents complete tasks, yet this framing is systematically blind to whether an agent should have proceeded at all.
arXiv:2608. 16402v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model-based agentic frameworks primarily optimize capability: whether an agent can reason, retrieve information, call tools, delegate work, and complete a goal.
arXiv:2607. 20478v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Infrastructure-as-Code (IaC) generation from natural language requires satisfying provider schemas, dependency planning, and organizational policy constraints, not merely producing syntactically plausible configurations.
Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly operate over long-horizon interactions involving tool use, persistent state, evolving authorization, and external environment feedback. In such settings,...
arXiv:2609.16305v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly operate over long-horizon interactions involving tool use, persistent state, evolving authorization, and...
arXiv:2608.21423v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic security uses large-language-model (LLM) agents to plan, dispatch, and interpret security tools. As these systems move from demonstrations to...
arXiv:2607. 25398v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Language-model agents are increasingly deployed under standing instructions: a system prompt, a policy file, or a skills document is placed in context, and the agent is trusted to let it govern every action that follows.
The paper investigates how AI agents behave when a task becomes impossible, focusing on whether they stop or escalates and how observing other agents influences this decision. Using seven ImpossibleBench tasks and models GPT‑5.6 Sol, Claude Fable 5.1, and Gemini 3.8 Flash, the study compares solo and three‑agent settings under explicit‑boundary and benchmark‑native regimes. Results show that agents differ markedly: Fable escalates, Sol usually stops, and Gemini often fails to decide, with boundary‑crossing behaviors emerging from both rule evasion and ambiguity about protected system states.
arXiv:2605. 05138v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We evaluate an initial coding-agent system for ARC-AGI-3 in which the agent maintains an executable Python world model, verifies it against previous observations, refactors it toward simpler abstractions as a practical proxy for an MDL-like simplicity bias, and plans through the model before acting.