arXiv:2609.16305v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly operate over long-horizon interactions involving tool use, persistent state, evolving authorization, and...
By Sadia Asif, Mohammad Mohammadi Amiri, Momin Abbas, Tejaswini Pedapati, Prasanna Sattigeri
HarnessRisk is a lifecycle-oriented benchmark for evaluating safety in agent harnesses that manage tools, extensions, state, permissions, and external actions. It defines six operational phases—Harness Configuration, Capability Extension, Runtime Operation, State Persistence, Action Control, and Incident Recovery—and includes 128 sandboxed cases pairing benign user objectives with adversarial instructions. Across three harnesses, six language models, and 14 configurations, attack success rates vary from 12.6% to 80.9%, with the most vulnerable phase being Harness Configuration.
"whyItMatters":"The benchmark demonstrates that safety failures can arise in multiple harness responsibilities and that even explicit risk detection does not guarantee safe action, underscoring the need for comprehensive evaluation across model and harness configurations."
By Yajing Bai, Jinhao Duan, Jie Peng, Xianfeng Wu, Sijia Liu, Song Wang, Tianlong Chen
LPS-Bench is a benchmark designed to evaluate the safety awareness of computer‑use agents (CUAs) in long‑horizon planning tasks that involve tool workflows. It uses a template‑guided multi‑agent pipeline to generate user instructions, simulated toolkits, and case‑specific safety criteria, followed by human review, allowing scalable expansion without building separate application environments. The benchmark includes 570 cases from 65 scenarios across seven task domains and nine planning‑risk types, and an LLM‑based evaluator assesses tool choices, arguments, and responses throughout execution. Evaluations of 13 LLM agents show persistent safety failures in both benign and adversarial settings, with prompt‑based interventions providing only model‑dependent improvements.
By Tianyu Chen, Chujia Hu, Dongrui Liu, Xia Hu, Wenjie Wang
arXiv:2607. 18366v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) serving as planners in tool-using autonomous agents introduce dynamic reliability risks in multi-turn execution.
By Shasha Yu, Fiona Carroll, Barry L. Bentley
arXiv:2607. 20982v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As large language model agents increasingly operate autonomously with access to tools and external environments, ensuring their safe and reliable behavior becomes critical.
By Vishal Ishwar Naik, Chenyu Xu, Donna Dong, Hussein Hassan, Abhishek Pradhan, Ofer Mendelevitch, Tallat Shafat, Humayun Irshad
arXiv:2606. 18356v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using language-model agents introduce security failures that go beyond unsafe text: they can disclose protected objects, write persistent memory, send messages, modify databases, or trigger harmful code and tool effects.
By Yuchuan Tian, Mengyu Zheng, Haocheng Mei, Ye Yuan, Chao Xu, Xinghao Chen, Hanting Chen, Yu Wang
arXiv:2607. 29254v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agents extend large language models (LLMs) with external tools, enabling them to perform complex tasks and translate model outputs into consequential real-world actions.
By Minghui Pan, Jiayuxuan Yang, Yuanyuan Yuan, Yu Jiang, Zhenpeng Chen
arXiv:2602.03100v2 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as agents that operate in real-world environments, introducing safety risks beyond linguisti...
By Jingnan Zheng, Yanzhen Luo, Jingjun Xu, Bingnan Liu, Yuxin Chen, Chenhang Cui, Gelei Deng, Chaochao Lu, Xiang Wang, An Zhang, Tat-Seng Chua
arXiv:2608. 09885v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The safety of large language model (LLM) agents depends not only on model weights but also on the agent harness that manages context, memory, tools, permissions, and runtime control.
By Wanying Qu, Qinghua Mao, Yu Li, Jiyao Liu, Xin Zhang, Dadi Guo, Yanxu Zhu, Qingyu Liu, Leitao Yuan, Xi Lin, Shanfeng Zhu, Yanwei Fu, Jing Shao, Xia Hu, Dongrui Liu
arXiv:2606. 02965v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Benchmarks for autonomous agents measure whether agents complete tasks, yet this framing is systematically blind to whether an agent should have proceeded at all.
By Victor Ojewale, Suresh Venkatasubramanian
LITMUS is a benchmark for testing the safety of large language model agents in real operating system environments, focusing on behavior jailbreaks that can cause irreversible OS-level harm. It includes 819 high-risk test cases organized into a harmful seed subset and six attack-extended subsets covering jailbreak speaking, skill injection, and entity wrapping, and employs a semantic-physical dual verification mechanism with OS-level state rollback. Evaluation of frontier agents shows that even strong models can execute dangerous operations, exhibit execution hallucination, and are vulnerable to skill injection and entity wrapping attacks.
By Chiyu Zhang, Lu Zhou, Xiaogang Xu, Huiqin Yang, Bendong Jiang, Xiaolei Zhang, Yiran Zhao, Ruyi Chen, Jiafei Wu, Liming Fang, Zhe Liu
arXiv:2606. 16605v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: World models are widely used in robotic and agentic engineering control systems due to their ability to learn latent dynamics for planning and decision-making.
By Junjian Zhang, Hao Tan, Ruonan Li, Dong Zhu, Aiping Li, Zhaoquan Gu