arXiv:2608. 02786v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI systems can fail silently.
Agentic systems entering production typically operate as partially integrated assemblies where structural defects, not task-level errors, dominate the failure landscape. At this maturity level, task-level error detection may be infeasible: structural failure modes mask the signal that task-level monitors are designed to detect.
arXiv:2606. 02494v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic systems entering production typically operate as partially integrated assemblies where structural defects, not task-level errors, dominate the failure landscape.
arXiv:2606. 01365v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Tool-using multi-agent large language model (LLM) systems spend computation through model tokens, tool calls, retries, and code execution before producing an answer.
arXiv:2608. 02464v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM agents fail mid-episode -- they loop, cascade tool errors, drift off goal, fabricate results, or silently absorb corrupted content -- and the standard remedy, judging every step with a second LLM, costs more than the agent itself.
arXiv:2606. 11267v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Data leakage -- contamination of a model with information unavailable at baseline -- is the dominant reproducibility failure in machine-learning-based science, yet detection tools require training code, external data, or domain expertise.
arXiv:2607. 12469v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Many agent-safety evaluation results are not yet load-bearing evidence: identical nominal outcomes (task success, attack success, monitor scores) may sit atop materially different evidence regimes.
arXiv:2606. 29654v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Multi-agent deliberation among LLMs can improve reasoning, but deployment requires deciding when the current answer is reliable enough to act on and when it should be escalated to human review.
arXiv:2606. 14589v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM agent systems increasingly run as long-lived autonomous runtimes: scheduling jobs, calling tools, maintaining memory, and pushing results to humans.
arXiv:2608. 14089v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety classifiers deployed with large language models often fail for two reasons: their decisions reflect the policy learned during training rather than the deployer's desired policy, and their performance degrades as deployment traffic evolves.
arXiv:2607. 20436v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety evaluations often assume that behavior observed during testing reflects behavior in ordinary use, but fine-tuning can break this assumption.
arXiv:2606. 10241v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Autonomous improvement loops are hard to trust because the improvement process is usually external scaffolding bolted onto the agent: failures go unlogged, diagnoses cannot be replayed, and promote-or-discard decisions land in a side database rather than the agent's own history.
arXiv:2604. 16706v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Automated evaluation of tool-using large language model (LLM) agents is widely assumed to be reliable, yet this assumption is rarely validated against human annotation.