arXiv:2606. 25059v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Black-box LLMs (accessible only via API) are vulnerable to distillation attacks, in which an attacker queries the model and trains a student on its outputs.
By Lena Libon, Pura Peetathawatchai, Michael Aerni, Daniel Paleka, Florian Tram\`er
arXiv:2610.07654v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: On-policy distillation (OPD) has attracted growing attention as an effective way to transfer capabilities from teacher models to student models. Rece...
By Jian Luo, Kehan Qi, Qingqiao Hu, Meilong Xu, Jiacheng Qiu, Weimin Lyu, Jiawei Zhou, Chao Chen
arXiv:2610.06401v2 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: Tool-using language-model agents are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because they must act on untrusted external content. Existing tr...
By Mohamed Dhouib, Clement Elliker, Alexi Canesse, Ma\"el Jenny, Lucas-Andrei Thil, Mahammed El Sharkawy, Sonia Vanier, Elie Bursztein
arXiv:2609.37011v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Federated learning enables multiple clients to collaboratively train models without sharing their private data. However, the lack of visibility into...
By Hongxu Su, Jianzhu Yao, Xuechao Wang, Pramod Viswanath
Federated fine-tuning of large language models (LLMs) enables collaborative training without exposing raw data. However, a recent attack, NeuroImprint [1] (arXiv:2606.
arXiv:2606. 14210v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in privacy-sensitive domains, where users must balance the risk of data exposure through external APIs against the high computational cost of local deployment.
By Zixuan Gu, Xiaojun Ye, Yang Liu
arXiv:2607. 27940v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Federated fine-tuning of large language models (LLMs) enables collaborative training without exposing raw data.
By Cheng Wei (Honor Device Co., Ltd., Shenzhen, China)
arXiv:2607. 02903v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Explainability is central to building trustworthy AI, yet explanation interfaces can inadvertently provide adversaries with an expanded privacy-related attack surfaces.
By Varun Sharma, Kar Wai Fok, Vrizlynn L. L. Thing
arXiv:2607. 09692v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Model distillation -- training on outputs from stronger third-party models -- is widely used to boost performance, but raises concerns about unfair advantages and policy violations.
By Rajat Rawat, Sizhe Chen, Akshay Anand, Michael Duan, Bob Rotsted, Sewon Min
arXiv:2601. 17360v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: An adversary observing a model's released prediction can infer sensitive attributes of the queried input, or even reconstruct representatives of the model's training data.
By Jiankai Jin, Xiangzheng Zhang, Zhao Liu, Wenzhuo Xu, Dongdong Yang, Deyue Zhang, Quanchen Zou
arXiv:2602. 02819v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs) aim to distinguish training points (members) from unseen data (non-members), and are widely used to quantify memorization and assess privacy risks.
By Mathieu Even, Cl\'ement Berenfeld, Linus Bleistein, Tudor Cebere, Julie Josse, Aur\'elien Bellet
arXiv:2606. 00986v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Federated learning (FL) enables multiple data holders to train machine learning models collaboratively without centralizing raw data, making it useful in privacy sensitive domains such as healthcare and institutional data sharing.
By Ivo Osterberg Nilsson, Maximilian Birr Engvall, Viktor Valadi, Teddy Lazebnik