arXiv Machine Learning
Jul 30

ToxScreen: Detecting Whether an LLM Has Been Poisoned

arXiv:2607. 26849v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time.

By Anthony Hughes, Nicole Xing, Collin Francel, Andy Kim, Andrew Draganov
Hugging Face Trending Papers
Jul 29

ToxScreen: Detecting Whether an LLM Has Been Poisoned

As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time. We ask whether a defender can recover such a trigger under realistic affordances, namely white-box access to the weights and knowledge of the behavior of concern, but no training data, no trusted reference model, no knowledge of the trigger, and no certainty that the model is poisoned.

arXiv AI
Sep 10

How to Backdoor Image Knowledge Distillation

The paper demonstrates that image knowledge distillation can be backdoored even when the teacher model is clean, by poisoning the distillation dataset with triggered and manipulated images that the teacher already classifies as a target label. The attack, effective at poisoning rates as low as 10%, uses targeted adversarial perturbations and GAN-based class transitions to embed a backdoor into the student model while preserving its performance on clean data. The study highlights that the security of knowledge distillation depends not only on the teacher but also on the integrity of the distillation data.

By Qian Ma, Chen Wu, Prasenjit Mitra, Sencun Zhu