arXiv AI

TIER: Trajectory-Invariant Explanation Regularization for Membership Privacy

arXiv:2607. 02903v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Explainability is central to building trustworthy AI, yet explanation interfaces can inadvertently provide adversaries with an expanded privacy-related attack surfaces.

arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 11

SoK: Privacy Attacks on Machine Learning via Explainable AI

The paper surveys 25 studies that use explainable AI to compromise machine learning models, covering attacks such as model extraction, membership inference, and model inversion. It distinguishes between how explanations are obtained—through target releases, attacker-derived methods, secondary disclosure, privileged access, or global artifacts—and shows that explanations can lower extraction costs and reveal membership signals via statistics, recourse distance, and robustness. The authors compare threat models, signals, and defenses, concluding that no single explanation type is always unsafe and that protection must be tailored to the specific acquisition path and target asset.

By Abdullah Caglar Oksuz, Anisa Halimi, Erman Ayday
arXiv Machine Learning
Aug 20

Gradient Mirage: Trainable yet Label-Unidentifiable Gradients in Large Language Model Split Learning

Gradient Mirage is a defense for large language model split learning that disrupts the assumption that exposed gradients faithfully reflect the client’s full-label training objective, thereby thwarting gradient matching attacks. It introduces inconsistencies across objective, direction, and scale by using selective autoregressive supervision, scale blinding, and directional privatization with a von Mises-Fisher mechanism. The method preserves utility through dual-track backpropagation and bottom-gradient recovery, achieving a stronger privacy‑utility trade‑off in experiments.

By Shiyu Miao, Yunlong Mao, Zirui Huang, Liang Yao, Tianshuo Zheng, Yanhui Gu, Fan Liu, Sheng Zhong
arXiv Machine Learning
Jun 2

Causal Evaluation of Membership Inference Attacks

arXiv:2602. 02819v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs) aim to distinguish training points (members) from unseen data (non-members), and are widely used to quantify memorization and assess privacy risks.

By Mathieu Even, Cl\'ement Berenfeld, Linus Bleistein, Tudor Cebere, Julie Josse, Aur\'elien Bellet