Hugging Face Trending Papers

Text-Anchored Semantic Perturbations for Transferable Jailbreak Attacks on Multimodal Large Language Models

arXiv Computation and Language
Aug 25

Text-Anchored Semantic Perturbations for Transferable Jailbreak Attacks on Multimodal Large Language Models

The paper introduces TA-SPA, a black‑box jailbreak method for multimodal large language models that generates transferable perturbations in a text‑anchored semantic space. It combines Text‑Anchored Semantic Factorization (TASF) to separate cross‑modal semantic factors from modality‑specific residuals with Semantic‑Preserving Augmentation (SPA) to diversify harmful target anchors while maintaining semantic consistency. Experiments demonstrate strong attack effectiveness and transferability to commercial MLLMs, with competitive performance against representative defenses.

By Wenyun Li, Guiping Cao, Xiangyuan Lan, Zheng Zhang
arXiv AI
Aug 24

ReFrame: Evidence-Guided Test-Time Safety Alignment in Multimodal Large Language Models

ReFrame is a training‑free framework that enhances safety alignment for multimodal large language models at test time. It uses two lightweight agents: one generates risk and utility evidence, and the other rewrites prompts and routes images to create a safe proxy before invoking the deployed MLLM. Experiments show that ReFrame improves jailbreak defense, safety awareness, and reduces over‑sensitivity while maintaining multimodal utility.

By Wenzheng Jiang, Xuankun Rong, Yuanzhao Zhai, Dawei Feng, Huaimin Wang
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 11

Understanding In-Context Multimodal Jailbreaks via Posterior Reweighting

The paper introduces a posterior reweighting framework to explain and counter in-context learning jailbreaks in multimodal large language models. It models the model as switching between safe and harmful behavioral modes, interpreting prompt demonstrations as evidence that shifts the posterior. Using this view, the authors derive scaling laws for jailbreak effectiveness and propose a defense that injects benign counter‑evidence to suppress harmful drift while maintaining utility.

By Xu Zhang, Dev Mistry, Xiang Xu, Ren Wang
arXiv Computer Vision
Aug 27

Learning to Detect Unseen Jailbreak Attacks in Large Vision-Language Models

The paper introduces Learning to Detect (LoD), a framework for identifying unseen jailbreak attacks in Large Vision‑Language Models without relying on attack data or hand‑crafted heuristics. LoD extracts layer‑wise safety representations via Multi‑modal Safety Concept Activation Vectors and compresses them into a one‑dimensional anomaly score using a Safety Pattern Auto‑Encoder. Experiments show that LoD achieves state‑of‑the‑art AUROC across diverse unseen attacks on multiple LVLMs while improving efficiency.

By Shuang Liang, Zhihao Xu, Jiaqi Weng, Jialing Tao, Hui Xue, Xiting Wang
Hugging Face Trending Papers
Aug 19

Breaking the weakest link to evade vision language models

The paper investigates how Vision Language Models (VLMs) can be fooled by tiny, human‑imperceptible changes to images. It introduces a gradient‑based attack that targets only the vision encoder, reducing computational cost while still effectively disrupting both untargeted and targeted multimodal interpretations. Experiments on open‑source VLMs such as Qwen2.5‑VL, Granite‑Vision, FastVLM, and Phi‑3.5‑Vision demonstrate that these small perturbations can dramatically alter the models’ textual outputs.

arXiv AI
Oct 1

CollageAttack: Exploiting Cross-Modal Alignment Flaws in T2I Models through Spatial Text Composition

CollageAttack is a black‑box jailbreak that exploits cross‑modal alignment flaws in text‑to‑image models by shifting harmful semantics into the image plane. It combines context‑relevant scenes, scene‑grounded textual carriers, and spatially distributed text fragments to produce images that reveal hidden harmful meaning. Experiments on both open‑weight and commercial models show success rates up to 86.0%, outperforming the strongest baseline by 18.5 percentage points and consistently generating more harmful outputs while preserving the source intent.

By Zhiyi Mou, Yao Lu, Wangze Ni, Di Hong, Dakun Shen, Haoyang Li, Chen Jason Zhang, Alexander Zhou, Kui Ren