arXiv Computation and Language By Wenyun Li, Guiping Cao, Xiangyuan Lan, Zheng Zhang

Text-Anchored Semantic Perturbations for Transferable Jailbreak Attacks on Multimodal Large Language Models

Read the original on arXiv Computation and Language →

The paper introduces TA-SPA, a black‑box jailbreak method for multimodal large language models that generates transferable perturbations in a text‑anchored semantic space. It combines Text‑Anchored Semantic Factorization (TASF) to separate cross‑modal semantic factors from modality‑specific residuals with Semantic‑Preserving Augmentation (SPA) to diversify harmful target anchors while maintaining semantic consistency. Experiments demonstrate strong attack effectiveness and transferability to commercial MLLMs, with competitive performance against representative defenses.

Machine-generated by The Flow from the publisher's headline and feed description — not written or checked by a human. The full article lives at arXiv Computation and Language.

arXiv AI
Aug 24

ReFrame: Evidence-Guided Test-Time Safety Alignment in Multimodal Large Language Models

ReFrame is a training‑free framework that enhances safety alignment for multimodal large language models at test time. It uses two lightweight agents: one generates risk and utility evidence, and the other rewrites prompts and routes images to create a safe proxy before invoking the deployed MLLM. Experiments show that ReFrame improves jailbreak defense, safety awareness, and reduces over‑sensitivity while maintaining multimodal utility.

By Wenzheng Jiang, Xuankun Rong, Yuanzhao Zhai, Dawei Feng, Huaimin Wang
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 11

Understanding In-Context Multimodal Jailbreaks via Posterior Reweighting

The paper introduces a posterior reweighting framework to explain and counter in-context learning jailbreaks in multimodal large language models. It models the model as switching between safe and harmful behavioral modes, interpreting prompt demonstrations as evidence that shifts the posterior. Using this view, the authors derive scaling laws for jailbreak effectiveness and propose a defense that injects benign counter‑evidence to suppress harmful drift while maintaining utility.

By Xu Zhang, Dev Mistry, Xiang Xu, Ren Wang