The paper investigates reconstructing fully connected neural networks by combining cryptanalytic weight-direction extraction with learning from predicted labels. It adapts ReLU extraction to Leaky ReLU, compares sign-search methods, and estimates biases and output layers, proving conditional bounds for direction recovery and sign selection. Experiments show that Leaky ReLU can recover 51–57 neurons in the deepest hidden layer of a large synthetic architecture, while ReLU recovers none, and that reconstructed models on CIFAR‑10 achieve high prediction agreement and outperform a distillation baseline on several functional metrics.
arXiv:2609.21941v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The importance of deep neural networks (DNNs) is widely recognized, and the parameters obtained through training are regarded as valuable assets. Rec...
arXiv:2510.06692v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have attracted significant attention, and their internal models are now considered valuable intellectual assets. Extrac...
arXiv:2505. 03646v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Adversarial robustness of deep autoencoders (AEs) has received less attention than that of discriminative models, although their compressed latent representations induce ill-conditioned mappings that can amplify small input perturbations and destabilize reconstructions.
arXiv:2608. 06631v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Cryptanalytic extraction has been demonstrated for ReLU networks, for networks using componentwise activations such as GELU or SiLU, and for a Transformer's final projection matrix.
arXiv:2606. 29951v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Interpretable Mesomorphic Neural Networks (IMNs) offer a promising framework that combines the predictive power of deep neural networks with the interpretability of linear models.
arXiv:2605.13214v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Recent cryptographic results establish that neural networks can be backdoored such that no efficient algorithm can distinguish them from a cl...
arXiv:2507. 05113v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are susceptible to backdoor attacks, where adversaries poison training data to implant backdoor into the victim model.
arXiv:2608. 14126v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: To mitigate attention dilution in high-entropy TLS 1.
arXiv:2608.28843v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We show that smooth two-layer feed-forward networks (FFNs) expose an additional structural model extraction channel under a chosen-input raw-output o...
The paper introduces Fast Preemptive Robustification (FPR), a lightweight defense that enhances the robustness of deep neural networks against transferable adversarial attacks. By sharpening Laplacian responses through a single 3×3 channel‑wise convolution, FPR eliminates the need for surrogate models, iterative optimization, or specialized training. Experiments show that FPR lowers untargeted attack success rates by 12.7% and reduces targeted attack success from 10.7% to 4.1%.
The paper investigates how single‑hidden‑layer MLPs can fit training data yet fail to recover the underlying rule, focusing on higher‑order interactions and nuisance inputs. Using synthetic parity tasks, the authors benchmark different optimizers (SGD, Adam, Muon) and show that while all achieve perfect accuracy on second‑order interactions, performance drops sharply for higher orders, with Muon outperforming the others at fourth order. Experiments also reveal that freezing or removing nuisance‑related weights dramatically alters training outcomes, highlighting the role of nuisance learning in shaping the rules a shallow network can represent.
arXiv:2608. 00732v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Backdoor attacks pose a serious threat to deep neural networks, especially when training relies on third-party data, allowing adversaries to inject malicious behaviors through data poisoning.