arXiv:2608.28691v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Wearable VLM pipelines promise continuous multimodal assistance from egocentric visual capture: a user asks a task-driven question about the surround...
arXiv:2608. 11691v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Reinforcement-learning (RL) post-training equips multimodal large reasoning models (MLRMs) with exploratory chains of thought (CoT), substantially improving visual reasoning.
arXiv:2605. 16651v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Explanation mechanisms are increasingly used to support transparency and trust in vision-language models (VLMs), particularly in settings where model decisions require human oversight.
DEFUSE is a backdoor detection framework for self‑supervised encoders that uses a conditional diffusion generative model to estimate representation‑conditioned image likelihoods. By fine‑tuning a pretrained diffusion model, DEFUSE performs semantic reconstruction in a reference encoder’s representation space, enabling it to detect backdoors without needing uninfected data or precomputed pseudo‑labels. Experiments show that DEFUSE outperforms existing detectors on both visual SSL and vision‑language encoders, reducing reliance on prior knowledge of the victim model or attack strategy.
The paper investigates how Vision Language Models (VLMs) can be fooled by tiny, human‑imperceptible changes to images. It introduces a gradient‑based attack that targets only the vision encoder, reducing computational cost while still effectively disrupting both untargeted and targeted multimodal interpretations. Experiments on open‑source VLMs such as Qwen2.5‑VL, Granite‑Vision, FastVLM, and Phi‑3.5‑Vision demonstrate that these small perturbations can dramatically alter the models’ textual outputs.
arXiv:2607. 25522v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The rapid advancement of video generation models has led to the increasing misuse of image-to-video (I2V) models.
arXiv:2601. 21628v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Diffusion models have achieved remarkable progress in image generation, but their increasing deployment raises serious concerns about privacy and copyright.
Image matching is a core component of applications such as Simultaneous Localization and Mapping (SLAM), Visual Localization, and Structure from Motion (SfM). However, the local image features central...
The paper investigates how Vision Language Models (VLMs) can be fooled by small, human‑imperceptible changes to images. It introduces a gradient‑based attack that targets only the vision encoder, reducing computational cost while still effectively disrupting both untargeted and targeted multimodal alignment. Experiments on open‑source VLMs such as Qwen2.5‑VL, Granite‑Vision, FastVLM, and Phi‑3.5‑Vision demonstrate that these perturbations can significantly alter the models’ textual outputs.
arXiv:2409. 01062v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Model Inversion (MI) attacks pose a significant privacy threat by reconstructing private training data from machine learning models.
The paper introduces TempJail, a temporal jailbreak framework targeting image‑to‑video generation models. It exploits a newly identified vulnerability where unsafe semantics arise from the composition of frames over time, rather than from single‑frame violations. By decomposing malicious captions into visual conditions and temporal instructions, and by employing controlled latent perturbations and template rewriting, TempJail achieves a 23.3 % higher attack success rate than prior methods on several commercial models.
The paper investigates whether large, instruction‑following Vision‑Language Models (VLMs) can reliably perform zero‑shot image privacy classification. It compares three open‑source VLMs to specialized privacy models on two public benchmarks, evaluating accuracy, robustness to image degradations (compression, lighting changes, noise), inference speed, and parameter count. The findings show that while VLMs remain robust to perturbations, they are less accurate and significantly slower than smaller, purpose‑built privacy models, indicating that scaling alone does not guarantee effective privacy classification.