arXiv Machine Learning

Modeling Decisions in Blockchain Analytics: A Leakage-Aware Evaluation of Tree-Based vs. Sequential Models

arXiv:2607. 27350v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Sybil bots are Ethereum actors that imitate legitimate users to extract airdrop rewards or influence governance.

Hugging Face Trending Papers
Aug 20

Catching the Rug: Early Prediction of Fraudulent Memecoins on Solana via Machine Learning

The paper presents a method for early detection of fraudulent memecoins (rug pulls) on the Solana blockchain, using a dataset of 6.4 million tokens collected over seven months. It shows that most rug pulls occur within an hour of launch and that classic machine learning models, especially Gradient Boosting (XGBoost), can reliably predict them using only the first five minutes of trading data. Cross‑platform data fusion between PumpFun and Raydium further improves detection by reducing domain shift.

arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 24

Quality over Quantity: Semi-Supervised Detection of Illicit Bitcoin Flows via Feature Engineering

The paper presents a semi‑supervised learning framework for detecting illicit Bitcoin flows in Shared Send Mixers, using a large historical dataset of 163 million transactions. It demonstrates that the success of SSL depends on data quality rather than sheer volume, with high‑fidelity features such as KeyLinker address clustering and Shared Send Untangling complexity metrics achieving an F1 score of 0.84 on unlabeled data. The study also shows that common heuristics like One‑Time Change introduce noise, underscoring the importance of smarter feature engineering in blockchain forensics.

By Yekaterina Smolenkova, Nickolay Larionov, Nikolay Ivanov, Yury Yanovich
arXiv AI
Jun 17

An AI Security Agent for Banking: Multi-Vector Fraud and AML Detection Across Retail and Corporate Accounts

arXiv:2606. 17555v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Banks simultaneously face signature-based fraud (card-not-present attacks, account takeover, ATM cloning) and behavioural financial crime (structuring, layering, mule networks, business email compromise) -- two threat families with fundamentally different detection requirements.

By Joseph Walusimbi, Joshua Benjamin Ssentongo