The paper investigates why decision-makers such as banks and employers might provide algorithmic recourse to applicants rejected by automated systems. In a screening model where recourse improves an applicant’s value but costs vary across individuals, the optimal policy is a threshold rule: reject low‑scoring applicants, offer recourse to those with intermediate scores, and accept high‑scoring applicants outright. This strategy creates a new acceptance path for some marginal applicants while imposing a costly hurdle on others who would otherwise be accepted.
arXiv:2609.39877v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Algorithmic recourse provides individuals who have received undesirable outcomes from machine learning models with suggestions for minimum-cost impro...
arXiv:2608. 04677v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Algorithmic recourse seeks to help individuals reverse unfavorable automated decisions by recommending actionable changes that achieve a desired outcome.
arXiv:2607. 28497v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Algorithmic recourse aims to provide individuals with actionable changes to improve their predicted outcomes in high-stakes classification settings, such as loan and mortgage applications.
The study examines a two‑agent résumé screening process where both employer‑side and candidate‑side agents exchange evidence before deciding who advances, contrasting it with the traditional one‑call automated screening. Using GPT‑5.5 and Claude Opus 4.7 on 600 constructed résumé‑job pairs, the two‑agent method increased the proportion of applications advanced (up to 39.3% for GPT‑5.5) and raised pass rates for borderline cases from 4.5% to 26.2% (GPT‑5.5) and 6.5% to 16.1% (Opus 4.7). The results show that the screening procedure itself, rather than just the underlying model, determines which candidates reach human review and how consistently that access recurs.
The paper examines how an agent’s probability report is evaluated twice—once by a strictly proper scoring rule and again by an approval rule that determines a decision. It shows that when the approval rule is welfare‑maximizing, it cannot be affine, yet the resulting distortion is predictable and can be mitigated by a reserve report that neutralizes the cost of pretending to be the marginal type. A Lipschitz rule with a single kink achieves first‑best welfare, while smooth rules cannot, and the key constraint is the steepness of the rule rather than its smoothness.
The paper argues that traditional probabilistic fairness metrics can miss significant disparities in the actual consequences of decisions. By introducing a utility-based framework, the authors show that a process can satisfy ε-fairness yet still be maximally unfair when utilities are considered. They apply this framework to college admissions and credit‑risk assessment, demonstrating that equalizing probabilities alone may mask unequal utility outcomes across groups.
arXiv:2603. 05175v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The rapid proliferation of AI applications has intensified debate on effective regulation of these black-box services.
arXiv:2004. 10846v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Problem definition: Traditionally, New York City's top 8 public schools have selected candidates solely based on their scores in the Specialized High School Admissions Test (SHSAT).
arXiv:2601. 10600v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: In the context of multi-agent multi-armed bandits (MA-MAB), fairness is often reduced to outcomes: maximizing welfare, reducing inequality, or balancing utilities.
arXiv:2402. 01811v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Credit scoring has been catalogued by the European Commission and the Executive Office of the US President as a high-risk classification task, in light of the potential harms of making loan approval decisions based on models that would be biased against certain groups.
arXiv:2608. 06422v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Giving an LLM judge more compute does not necessarily make it check more requirements.
arXiv:2407. 14766v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: This paper presents a philosophical and experimental study of fairness interventions in AI classification, centered on the explainability and transparency of corrective methods, and on the opposition between two fairness criteria, namely Demographic Parity and Equalized Odds.