arXiv:2608. 10459v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As LLM-generated content becomes more sophisticated, detection systems for distinguishing those texts from human-written text must operate at scale while handling diverse writing styles, domains, languages, and generator models.
arXiv:2605.12890v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has made machine-generated text increasingly difficult to distinguish from human-writte...
Distinguishing machine-generated text (MGT) from human-written text (HWT) becomes increasingly important due to potential misuse. However, most supervised detectors often degrade out-of-domain (OOD) a...
arXiv:2608. 05430v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The remarkable instruction-following ability of modern LLMs has enabled their practical use as the minds of agents that can autonomously complete increasingly complex tasks.
arXiv:2606. 14060v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Adversarial conditions such as paraphrasing and targeted style transfer sharply degrade the accuracy of machine text detectors.
arXiv:2607. 14113v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: While many AI-generated text (AIGT) detectors achieve strong performance on clean inputs, their accuracy degrades significantly under light paraphrasing, word substitutions, character edits, and distribution shifts.
arXiv:2608. 28389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) augments LLMs with external documents, but public or user-editable sources expose RAG systems to data poisoning: attackers can inject malicious documents to steer outputs toward targeted answers.
InGuard introduces an inner guardrail for text-to-image generation that operates within the model’s own representations, avoiding external classifiers. It grades prompts using the text encoder’s embeddings, modifies risky embeddings with SAGE to produce safe images, and employs a latent detector to halt generation early. Evaluated on the RevGen Safety Benchmark, InGuard achieves a 97.9–98.8% safety rate across five open-weight models while reducing benign disturbances, model parameters, and denoising steps.
arXiv:2606. 31074v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Existing AI-generated text detectors are vulnerable to attacks that manipulate textual characteristics.
arXiv:2609.38722v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM watermarking has become an effective approach to distinguishing AI-generated text from human-written text by embedding detectable patterns during...
arXiv:2606. 07313v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Detecting machine-generated text is especially difficult under distribution shift, such as transfer across domains, source models, and editing attacks.
arXiv:2604. 06247v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) and Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaks and prompt injections delivered through text or images.
The paper investigates how to detect text generated by large language models (LLMs) when the data has been edited or contaminated. By modeling human and machine text as finite-order Markov processes with Huber contamination, the authors derive an exact boundary that determines when reliable detection is possible. They show that a clipped likelihood-ratio test can achieve vanishing worst‑case errors below this boundary and that clipping improves robustness across several detectors and datasets, yielding significant gains in true‑positive rates at a fixed false‑positive rate.