arXiv AI

FENCE: A Financial and Multimodal Jailbreak Detection Dataset

arXiv:2602. 18154v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Jailbreaking poses a significant risk to the deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) and Vision Language Models (VLMs).

arXiv Computer Vision
Aug 27

Learning to Detect Unseen Jailbreak Attacks in Large Vision-Language Models

The paper introduces Learning to Detect (LoD), a framework for identifying unseen jailbreak attacks in Large Vision‑Language Models without relying on attack data or hand‑crafted heuristics. LoD extracts layer‑wise safety representations via Multi‑modal Safety Concept Activation Vectors and compresses them into a one‑dimensional anomaly score using a Safety Pattern Auto‑Encoder. Experiments show that LoD achieves state‑of‑the‑art AUROC across diverse unseen attacks on multiple LVLMs while improving efficiency.

By Shuang Liang, Zhihao Xu, Jiaqi Weng, Jialing Tao, Hui Xue, Xiting Wang
arXiv Computation and Language
Aug 25

Text-Anchored Semantic Perturbations for Transferable Jailbreak Attacks on Multimodal Large Language Models

The paper introduces TA-SPA, a black‑box jailbreak method for multimodal large language models that generates transferable perturbations in a text‑anchored semantic space. It combines Text‑Anchored Semantic Factorization (TASF) to separate cross‑modal semantic factors from modality‑specific residuals with Semantic‑Preserving Augmentation (SPA) to diversify harmful target anchors while maintaining semantic consistency. Experiments demonstrate strong attack effectiveness and transferability to commercial MLLMs, with competitive performance against representative defenses.

By Wenyun Li, Guiping Cao, Xiangyuan Lan, Zheng Zhang
arXiv AI
Aug 19

Every Picture Tells a Dangerous Story: Memory-Augmented Multi-Agent Jailbreak Attacks on VLMs

The paper introduces MemJack, a memory‑augmented multi‑agent framework that automatically generates jailbreak attacks on Vision‑Language Models (VLMs) using benign natural images as visual anchors. MemJack discovers visual anchors, camouflages them semantically, evaluates responses, repairs via reflection, and replans dynamically, forming a closed‑loop attack pipeline. The authors also create MemJack‑Bench, a dataset of over 113,000 interactive multimodal jailbreak trajectories, and show that MemJack achieves a 71.48% attack success rate against Qwen3‑VL‑Plus, reaching 90% under extended budgets, outperforming other baselines on natural‑image evaluation.

By Jianhao Chen, Haoyang Chen, Hanjie Zhao, Haozhe Liang, Zheng Wang, Tieyun Qian