arXiv AI By Xu Zhang, Ziqing Hu, Shuo Han, Ren Wang

Jailbreak Connectivity: Towards Diverse, Transferable, and Universal Multimodal Large Language Model Jailbreak

Read the original on arXiv AI →

The paper introduces Jailbreak Connectivity (JC), a framework that exploits low‑loss pathways in image space to generate continuous adversarial paths for multimodal large language models (MLLMs). JC produces diverse jailbreak images, uses lightweight surrogate classifiers for cross‑model transfer, and applies a distribution‑level objective to create universal attacks across harmful queries. On the MM‑SafetyBench benchmark, JC achieves high attack success rates—84.01%, 85.77%, and 97.95% on Qwen3‑VL‑8B‑Instruct, InternVL3.5‑8B, and Gemma‑3‑12B‑IT respectively—outperforming existing baselines by up to 68.36 percentage points, and improves black‑box attack success on GPT‑5.6 and Gemini 3.1 Pro by 24.69 and 27.34 percentage points.

Machine-generated by The Flow from the publisher's headline and feed description — not written or checked by a human. The full article lives at arXiv AI.

arXiv AI
Oct 5

MLCommons Jailbreak Benchmark v1.0

MLCommons Jailbreak Benchmark v1.0 is a new methodology for assessing how well large language models resist single‑turn, text‑based jailbreak attacks. It evaluates eight open‑weight systems with 264 seed prompts across eleven hazard categories, using the AILuminate Assessment Standard v1.4 to measure the Resilience Gap—the difference in safety performance between baseline and adversarial conditions. The benchmark found that unsafe‑response rates rose from 11.08% to 18.65% under jailbreak conditions, yielding an average Resilience Gap of 7.57% and highlighting variability in attack effectiveness and evaluator reliability.

By Carsten Maple (Victor), Cagatay Yucel (Victor), Isaac Holeman (Victor), Chris Knotz (Victor), Peter Mattson (Victor), James Goel (Victor), Jonathan Petit (Victor), Sean McGregor (Victor), James Ezick (Victor), Abhishek Kumar (Victor), Alicia Parrish (Victor), Murali Emani (Victor), Kashyap Iyer (Victor), Faiza Khan Khattak (Victor), Washington Mbonu (Victor), Daniel Machlab (Victor), Eileen Long (Victor), Shaona Ghosh (Victor), Jibin Varghese (Victor), Roman Lutz (Victor), Andrew Gruen (Victor), Bennett Hillenbrand (Victor), Prabal Gupta (Victor), Mohammed Serrhini (Victor), Dhivya Nagasubramanian (Victor), Aakash Gupta (Victor), Jun (Victor), Lu, Kurt Bollacker, Chang Liu, Jonathan Petit, Cong Chen, Jean-Philippe Monteuuis, Brent Miller, Apurv Verma, Roman Eng, Armstrong Foundjem, Mohammed Serrhini
arXiv Computation and Language
Aug 25

Text-Anchored Semantic Perturbations for Transferable Jailbreak Attacks on Multimodal Large Language Models

The paper introduces TA-SPA, a black‑box jailbreak method for multimodal large language models that generates transferable perturbations in a text‑anchored semantic space. It combines Text‑Anchored Semantic Factorization (TASF) to separate cross‑modal semantic factors from modality‑specific residuals with Semantic‑Preserving Augmentation (SPA) to diversify harmful target anchors while maintaining semantic consistency. Experiments demonstrate strong attack effectiveness and transferability to commercial MLLMs, with competitive performance against representative defenses.

By Wenyun Li, Guiping Cao, Xiangyuan Lan, Zheng Zhang