arXiv Machine Learning

From Mathematical to Executable Certificates for Machine Unlearning

The paper introduces Executable Release Certification (ExecCert), a layer that certifies machine‑unlearning artifacts at release time. ExecCert either closes a method’s native certificate for the executed candidate or applies Retraining‑Reference Release Verification (RRV) to ensure fidelity to the current retain‑set. An incremental RRV is developed for frozen representations with a mutable ridge head, allowing certified evidence to be maintained across deletion requests without full reconstruction. Experiments on four unlearning implementations show ExecCert preserves valid certificates, tightens bounds, and improves release decisions, while incremental certification remains cost‑effective in sequential‑service settings.

arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 10

What a Deletion Certificate Covers, and Where It Expires: Auditable Removal from a Support-Vector Memory

The paper investigates how to provide verifiable deletion certificates for a dense key–value context memory used in support‑vector‑based readouts. By assigning explicit weights to keys and using a one‑class support‑vector boundary, the authors show that reserve keys can be removed without re‑solving, while active keys can be deleted with a decremental solver that matches the result of a full re‑solve. Extensive experiments on synthetic, near‑duplicate, clinical, and learned key sets demonstrate that maintained deletion achieves the same reference state as re‑solve, with negligible readout disagreement and significant speedups.

By Vishwajith Ramesh
arXiv AI
6d ago

Exact Unlearning After Data Curation

The paper investigates what a service must retain to faithfully reproduce a training pipeline after data deletion requests, focusing on a rule where earlier similar records block later ones. It shows that a limit on future deletions precisely determines which records can still be needed for training, enabling an exact repair of training statistics after repeated deletions. The authors also construct finite‑precision features for ridge regression and demonstrate that the required private information can be minimized across a sequence of deletion requests, validating their approach on 1,001 AskUbuntu records.

By Priyank Jayraj, Devanshu sahoo, Uday Mittal
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 3

Source-Free Class Relearning: Diagnosing Forgetting in Class Unlearning

The paper investigates whether a model that has undergone class unlearning can still recover forgotten classes without access to original data. It introduces a white‑box audit method that generates synthetic probes in representation space, filters them by confidence, and relabels boundary‑adjacent probes as the forgotten class. The authors define a Relearning Score to quantify recovery while preserving retain performance, and demonstrate that several unlearning techniques on CIFAR‑10, CIFAR‑100, and TinyImageNet can be fully recovered in a source‑free setting, sometimes even outperforming a retrained reference.

By Zahra Dehghani, Pablo Piantanida, Mohammadhadi Shateri
arXiv AI
Sep 11

Forgetting Only What Matters: Layer-Selective Unlearning toward Robust LLMs

The paper introduces Forgetting Only What Matters via Unlearning Layers (FOM-UL), a layer‑selective unlearning framework for large language models. FOM-UL uses a forget‑to‑retain significance score to identify transformer layers that strongly influence the forget set while being insensitive to the retain set, allowing targeted updates that preserve most of the model. Experiments on TOFU, KnowUnDo, and MUSE-style benchmarks show that FOM-UL reduces residual memorization and maintains utility better than several baselines, even after 8‑bit and 4‑bit post‑training quantization, and it also limits recovery of forgotten content in adversarial prompt tests.

By Ravi Ranjan, Olivera Kotevska, Agoritsa Polyzou
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 7

Client-Side Probing of Deleted Ridge Statistics in Federated Unlearning

The paper investigates how federated unlearning systems that broadcast updated linear classifiers after each client update can inadvertently leak the compact, additive summaries used for deletion. By submitting known changes and analyzing the returned classifiers, an attacker can recover the deleted sample’s class or even reinstate it. Experiments on MNIST and CIFAR‑10 show that high‑precision broadcasts enable exact label recovery, while lower precision limits fine‑grained recovery and diverse responses can prevent identification.

By Yijun Quan, Giovanni Montana