Epistemic Norms for AI Safety and Alignment Research
arXiv:2607. 24243v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Mainstream AI research emphasises capability growth and tolerates low failure rates when average-case performance is high.
arXiv:2512. 15783v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: This paper proposes a measurement standardisation framework that compresses expert-AI interactions into structured, comparable fields for prospective risk detection in deployed AI systems, without access to model internals.
arXiv:2607. 24243v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Mainstream AI research emphasises capability growth and tolerates low failure rates when average-case performance is high.
arXiv:2602.08889v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Quantitative risk assessment relies on structured expert elicitation to estimate unobservable properties. The Delphi method produces calibrated, au...
arXiv:2608. 00794v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Agentic AI evaluation pipelines produce benchmark scores that justify deployment decisions, safety certifications, and regulatory compliance claims.
arXiv:2606. 30219v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM evaluation and AI safety face a shared measurement problem: benchmark scores, reward-model signals, and reported safety metrics can improve while the latent properties they are meant to represent remain difficult to verify.
The study shows that while large language model (LLM) annotations of stakeholder consultation submissions are highly reproducible (intraclass correlations > 0.99), they do not reliably capture the intended construct measured by structured survey responses. Divergence between LLM-inferred and survey measures varies by stakeholder group, with business associations expressing more AI risk concern in text than in surveys, and spatial autocorrelation indicates neighboring European countries share similar text-based stances. Despite these divergences, survey-reported concerns remain strongly linked to support for explainability across all levels of divergence.
The paper introduces Governance-as-Code (GaC), a framework that translates the EU AI Act’s technical requirements into 43 machine‑checkable acceptance criteria across six compliance modules. GaC runs within a CI/CD pipeline, producing Article‑indexed audit evidence and providing actual Rego policy code. The authors validate GaC on two enterprise deployments, showing it reproduces manual audit findings—including three penalty‑triggering violations—while reducing audit labor by about 75%.
arXiv:2604. 14892v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Evaluating medical AI systems using expert clinician panels is costly and slow, motivating the use of large language models (LLMs) as alternative adjudicators.
arXiv:2607. 07766v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) have become significant providers of mental health support, yet they remain products of an attention economy whose operational and commercial targets favour sustained engagement over the friction that effective psychological support often requires.
arXiv:2608.29478v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Scholarly work which aims to describe potential societal impacts (e.g., risks) of proliferating technology (especially related to artificial intellig...
arXiv:2603. 11001v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Human uplift studies, or studies that measure the effects of AI access on human performance via randomized controlled trials (RCT) or similar methodologies, increasingly inform frontier AI governance and deployment decisions.
Large language models (LLMs) have become significant providers of mental health support, yet they remain products of an attention economy whose operational and commercial targets favour sustained engagement over the friction that effective psychological support often requires. Developers' safety responses have been largely reactive, addressing the most visible and acute harms while subtler, longer-term patterns of risk (e.
The paper introduces the Systemic Risk Index, an open pipeline and dashboard that aggregates evidence from 19 public AI benchmarks into four systemic‑risk categories defined by the EU GPAI Code of Practice. It evaluates 18 models using harm‑preserving perturbations and simulated deployment contexts, offering users the ability to switch between average and worst‑case aggregation and to trace each risk rating back to its benchmark evidence. The study finds that worst‑case scores can be 14 to 37 points lower than average scores, and that LLM judges agree with human graders at a level comparable to human‑human agreement.