arXiv AI

Posture and Sustainment Optimization Under Adversarial Uncertainty

arXiv:2608. 05256v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Pre-commitment posture, the assignment of military assets to theater locations before conflict scenarios resolve, is a critical and formally unsolved problem in joint operational planning.

arXiv AI
Jun 29

Uncertainty-Aware Reward Discounting for Mitigating Reward Hacking

arXiv:2604. 26360v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) systems face a compounding alignment challenge: not only are learned reward models uncertain about unseen state-action pairs, but the human preference annotations they are trained on are themselves inconsistent, context-dependent, and noisy.

By Disha Singha
arXiv AI
Sep 25

Understanding and Exploiting Initialization Anchoring Weakness in Feedback-Based Agent Planning

The paper investigates a vulnerability in feedback‑based agent planning, showing that the first round of feedback corrects a large portion of adversarial directions (46%) while subsequent rounds see a sharp decline (13% and 7%). The authors attribute this to an initialization anchoring weakness driven by plausible plan shifts, lack of counterevidence, and persistence of accepted directions. They introduce “InitAnchor”, a black‑box attack framework that exploits these factors, achieving high attack success rates across diverse tasks, architectures, and LLMs, and remaining effective against multiple defenses and real‑world agents.

By Chuanchao Zang, Jianing Wang, Wenyu Chen, Xiangtao Meng, Li Wang, Xinyu Gao, Peng Zhan, Zheng Li, Shanqing Guo
arXiv AI
Jul 14

Beyond Bayesian Nash: Learning Minimax-Regret Equilibria for Adversarial Team Games under Asymmetric Information

arXiv:2607. 09993v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Adversarial team games (ATGs) with asymmetric information, such as adversarial path-finding, goal search, and reachability games on graphs, require strategies that are robust to hidden opponent types, such as a hidden goal flag, and to deception.

By Naman Aggarwal, Jonathan P. How
arXiv AI
2d ago

Robust Is Salient: An Informed Adversary Moves the Optimal Signal onto the Salience Pole

The paper investigates how an informed adversary can influence the optimal signal in a constrained signalling channel. It finds that the adversary‑robust optimum aligns with the salience pole on most items, differing only on a small subset where the salience‑to‑Bayes coordinate is undefined. The study demonstrates that as the adversary’s persuasion budget increases, the optimal signal shifts from a posterior‑maximizing to a margin‑maximizing strategy, and provides a diagnostic check for evaluating adversary‑awareness.

By Cris Huynh