arXiv:2608. 00566v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Post-hoc model explainers such as LIME, SHAP, and Integrated Gradients are widely deployed to audit models in high-stakes sensitive domains, including finance, healthcare, and social welfare.
By Niraj Kumar, Harsh Kasyap
arXiv:2608.21803v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: As machine learning (ML) models are increasingly deployed in high-stakes environments, explainable AI (XAI) methods like SHAP and LIME have become es...
By Maraz Mia, Shovan Roy, Mir Mehedi A. Pritom, Maanak Gupta
arXiv:2506. 06488v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: A key tool in developing safe AI models is \emph{data auditing}, i.
By Pratiksha Thaker, Neil Kale, Zhiwei Steven Wu, Virginia Smith
arXiv:2608. 04365v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Audits have emerged as a critical instrument for algorithmic governance, providing a mechanism for external scrutiny and governance of machine learning models.
By Augustin Godinot, Sofiane Azogagh, Julien Ferry, S\'ebastien Gambs
The paper introduces a formal auditing framework to evaluate the robustness and fidelity of post‑hoc explainers such as SHAP and LIME. It defines a Trust Score that combines how stable an explanation is under small input perturbations with how well the highlighted features actually influence the model’s prediction. Experiments on a Madagascar malnutrition dataset show that even highly accurate models can produce unreliable explanations, and that fidelity scores degrade when models overfit.
By Rosa Elysabeth Ralinirina, Jean Christian Ralaivao, Niaiko Micha\"el Ralaivao, Alain Josu\'e Ratovondrahona, Thomas Mahatody
As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time. We ask whether a defender can recover such a trigger under realistic affordances, namely white-box access to the weights and knowledge of the behavior of concern, but no training data, no trusted reference model, no knowledge of the trigger, and no certainty that the model is poisoned.
Backdoor Sentinel introduces Temporal Noise Consistency (TNC), a new phenomenon where backdoor activation disrupts noise prediction consistency across adjacent diffusion timesteps, while clean inputs remain stable. Leveraging TNC, the authors propose TNC-Defense, a closed‑loop gray‑box framework that includes TNC‑Detect for auditors to identify and localize anomalous timesteps without accessing model weights, and TNC‑Detox for service providers to perform trigger‑agnostic, timestep‑aware corrections that suppress backdoor behavior. Experiments on five backdoor attacks show an 11% improvement in detection accuracy and a 98.5% invalidation rate of triggered samples with minimal impact on generation quality.
By Bingzheng Wang, Xiaoyan Gu, Hongbo Xu, Hongcheng Li, Zimo Yu, Jiang Zhou, Weiping Wang, Wu Liu
arXiv:2606. 14518v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The removal of learned data from Machine Learning models through Machine Unlearning (MU) has been widely studied; however, there has yet to be an agreed-upon scheme for auditing MU.
By Liou Tang, James Joshi, Ashish Kundu
arXiv:2607. 10455v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Autonomous CLI agents can now execute hundreds of actions across multi-hour sessions: writing code, executing shell commands, browsing the web, and managing cloud infrastructure, all with minimal human oversight.
By Kefan Song, Yanjun Qi
arXiv:2607. 26849v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time.
By Anthony Hughes, Nicole Xing, Collin Francel, Andy Kim, Andrew Draganov
arXiv:2609.36879v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: As LLM-based agents perform increasingly complex tasks, Agent Skills have emerged as a flexible mechanism for extending their capabilities. An Agent...
By Haoran Ou, Gelei Deng, Xuanye Zhang, Wenbo Guo, Tianwei Zhang, Kwok-Yan Lam
The paper introduces a low‑rank auditing method called LoRA as Oracle, which fits a small adapter to a hypothesis and analyzes the geometry, energy, and alignment of the resulting update relative to frozen weights. This approach directly measures what a model has internalized, independent of its output behavior, enabling detection of backdoors that behavioral audits miss. By identifying and erasing malicious internalizations within the same low‑rank subspace, the method consistently detects target classes across multiple datasets and architectures while preserving clean accuracy and operating at far lower parameter and memory cost than full‑model baselines.
By Marco Arazzi, Antonino Nocera