arXiv:2506. 06488v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: A key tool in developing safe AI models is \emph{data auditing}, i.
arXiv:2606. 17464v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Membership inference attacks (MIAs) are a canonical way to assess a machine learning model's privacy properties.
The paper examines the reliability of membership inference attack (MIA) vulnerability evaluation. It identifies two weaknesses: finite‑sample bias from sampling shadow datasets from a fixed superset, and miscalibration when aggregating true positive rates across individuals at very low false positive rates. The authors propose simple fixes that avoid extra computational cost and suggest further improvements with additional computation.
The paper introduces Pairwise Likelihood MIA (PL‑MIA), a unified membership inference attack that combines a Gaussian likelihood‑ratio statistic with population calibration and the Cauchy combination test. PL‑MIA generates p‑values from pairwise comparisons between a query point and reference points, then aggregates these continuous signals using the Cauchy test to preserve evidence strength. Experiments show that PL‑MIA surpasses strong baselines, boosting true positive rates by over 25% in low‑false‑positive settings, thereby validating the theoretical advantages of the proposed statistical framework.
arXiv:2608. 00566v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Post-hoc model explainers such as LIME, SHAP, and Integrated Gradients are widely deployed to audit models in high-stakes sensitive domains, including finance, healthcare, and social welfare.
arXiv:2602. 02819v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs) aim to distinguish training points (members) from unseen data (non-members), and are widely used to quantify memorization and assess privacy risks.
arXiv:2606. 16952v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The rapid adoption of generative AI and Large Language Models (LLMs) has spurred interest in synthetic data as a privacy-preserving alternative to sensitive real-world datasets.
arXiv:2606. 14518v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The removal of learned data from Machine Learning models through Machine Unlearning (MU) has been widely studied; however, there has yet to be an agreed-upon scheme for auditing MU.
arXiv:2606. 16952v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The rapid adoption of generative AI and Large Language Models (LLMs) has spurred interest in synthetic data as a privacy-preserving alternative to sensitive real-world datasets.
arXiv:2602. 18934v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Membership inference attacks (MIAs) threaten the privacy of machine learning models by revealing whether a specific data point was used during training.
arXiv:2602. 04899v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We present a data poisoning attack -- Phantom Transfer -- with the property that, even if you know precisely how the poison was placed into an otherwise benign dataset, you cannot filter it out.
Machine unlearning has been extensively studied in response to growing privacy concerns and regulatory requirements. However, auditing whether unlearning algorithms have truly erased the influence of specific data remains an open challenge.
arXiv:2606. 10481v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Parameter-efficient fine-tuning of large language models (LLMs) can exhibit problematic memorization of individual training examples.