arXiv Computer Vision

LETHE: Defending against Unauthorized Image-to-Video Generation via Value Diversity Collapse

LETHE is a new protection method that defends against unauthorized image‑to‑video generation by disrupting how diffusion models read a reference image. It achieves this by collapsing the spread of reference value vectors and attracting subsequent frames to these collapsed tokens, thereby severely degrading generated videos. Extensive experiments on modern I2V models and two human‑centric benchmarks show that LETHE outperforms existing protection techniques.

arXiv Computer Vision
4d ago

KVeil: First-Place Solution to ECCV 2026 LifeGenIP Challenge on Unlearnable Videos

The paper presents KVeil, the first‑place solution to the ECCV 2026 LifeGenIP Challenge on Unlearnable Videos. It introduces Reference Capacity Collapse and a Motion‑Guided EOT mechanism for Phase 1, and a two‑layer framework that protects facial and background regions for Phase 2, achieving strong protection against various customization attacks. The methods build on the authors’ prior work LETHE and are publicly available on GitHub.

By Boheng Li, Yueming Xing, Yiming Li, Jie Zhang, Han Qiu, Tianwei Zhang
arXiv Machine Learning
Jul 16

Delving into the Temporal Challenges of Unified Video Protection Against Image-to-Video and Fine-Tuning-based Customization

arXiv:2607. 13336v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Recent diffusion-based video generation models have enabled high-quality personalized video customization through both tuning-based pipelines, which fine-tune a video diffusion model, and reference-based pipelines such as image-to-video generation.

By Yuxin Huang, Ziming Hong, Mingming Gong, Wanyu Wang, Jing Zhang, Tongliang Liu
arXiv Computer Vision
Aug 28

TempJail: Temporal Jailbreak Attacks against Image-to-Video Generation Models

The paper introduces TempJail, a temporal jailbreak framework targeting image‑to‑video generation models. It exploits a newly identified vulnerability where unsafe semantics arise from the composition of frames over time, rather than from single‑frame violations. By decomposing malicious captions into visual conditions and temporal instructions, and by employing controlled latent perturbations and template rewriting, TempJail achieves a 23.3 % higher attack success rate than prior methods on several commercial models.

By Qi Lu, Zehui Guo, David Yuanda Gan, Zijing Li, Hengda Zhang, Weijun Xu, Qiankun Zhang
arXiv AI
Jun 17

Pulling The REINS: Training-Free Safety Alignment of Video Diffusion Models via Representation Steering

arXiv:2606. 17257v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Open-weight video diffusion models can generate photorealistic unsafe content, from violence to misinformation, yet existing defenses either require expensive safety fine-tuning that degrades general capability, or apply external filters that are trivially bypassed by adversarial prompts.

By Rohit Kundu, Arindam Dutta, Sarosij Bose, Athula Balachandran, Amit K. Roy-Chowdhury
Hugging Face Trending Papers
Jun 24

VPA-Guard: Defending and Benchmarking Image-to-Video Generation Against Visual Prompt Attacks

Recent advancements in Image-to-Video (I2V) generation have transformed input images from simple appearance references into interactive control interfaces where visual cues such as arrows, sketches, and emojis orchestrate complex video dynamics with unprecedented controllability. However, these seemingly innocuous static cues can be interpreted by models as executable temporal instructions, unfolding into harmful actions in the generated videos.

arXiv AI
Jun 11

Diffusion-based Cumulative Adversarial Purification for Vision Language Models

arXiv:2506. 03933v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Vision Language Models (VLMs) have shown remarkable capabilities in multimodal understanding, yet their susceptibility to adversarial perturbations poses a significant threat to their reliability in real-world applications.

By Jia Fu, Yongtao Wu, Yihang Chen, Kunyu Peng, Xiao Zhang, Volkan Cevher, Sepideh Pashami, Anders Holst
arXiv AI
Oct 5

Corrupted but Correct: Why Vision-Language Models Lie to Themselves Internally

The paper demonstrates that a targeted adversarial perturbation can reduce a vision‑language model’s training loss to near zero for a fixed target caption, yet the same model, when generating freely, still produces the correct description. This phenomenon, termed the train/inference gap, is traced to a single autoregressive step where the target token’s rank is fixed across all images, and further analysis shows that the language decoder, rather than the visual encoder, determines whether the corrupted signal is amplified or suppressed. The study uses a controlled two‑stage PGD attack on Qwen2.5‑VL‑7B‑Instruct and evaluates the effect on 200 held‑out COCO images, revealing that adversarial robustness in autoregressive VLMs largely depends on the language decoder’s prior. whyItMatters":"The findings suggest that defenses and faithfulness evaluations for deployed vision‑language models should focus on the language decoder rather than the visual encoder, as the former is the key determinant of robustness to adversarial perturbations."

By Arun Josephraj Arokiaraj, Zekun Wu, Adriano Koshiyama
arXiv Computer Vision
Oct 9

Boosting the Local Invariance for Better Adversarial Transferability

The paper introduces LI-Boost, a technique that enhances the local invariance of adversarial perturbations to improve their transferability across models. By demonstrating a positive correlation between local invariance and transferability, the authors show that LI-Boost significantly boosts five categories of transfer-based attacks on ImageNet, including CNNs, ViTs, defense mechanisms, commercial APIs, and vision-language models. Extensive experiments confirm the method’s effectiveness across diverse architectures and attack types.

By Bohan Liu, Xiaosen Wang
Hugging Face Trending Papers
Oct 5

Certification of Real Images through Calibrated Content Authentication

The paper examines the reliability of deepfake detectors, noting a decline in accuracy from 99.5% to 76% over four years and a drastic drop below 2% when adversarial perturbations are applied. It argues that content alone cannot determine provenance because generators can perfectly reproduce authentic images, so a new detection approach is proposed that certifies authenticity only if a generator cannot faithfully reconstruct the content. The authors demonstrate that their calibrated detector can limit false certifications to 1% while maintaining robustness against bounded‑perturbation attacks, though it struggles with arbitrary transformations.