The paper evaluates twenty deepfake detectors against ten recent generators, finding that accuracy has dropped from 99.5% to 76% and that adversarial perturbations can reduce detector performance to below 2%. It proposes a new detection paradigm that certifies authenticity only when a faithful reconstruction by a known generator is impossible, and shows that this calibrated detector can limit false certifications to at most 1% while remaining robust to bounded‑perturbation attacks. The study also highlights the erosion of post‑hoc verifiability, noting that newer generators can reproduce a larger fraction of previously unreplicable images.
By Sarim Hashmi, Abdelrahman Elsayed, Mohammed Talha Alam, Samuele Poppi, Nils Lukas
arXiv:2504. 14798v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Machine Unlearning (MUL) has emerged as a key mechanism for privacy protection and content regulation, yet current techniques often fail to guarantee the complete removal of sensitive information.
By Hao Xuan, Xingyu Li
arXiv:2410. 01574v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The rapid advancement of Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI) capabilities is accompanied by a concerning rise in its misuse.
By Sina Mavali, Jonas Ricker, David Pape, Asja Fischer, Lea Sch\"onherr
The paper introduces CertDW, a certified dataset watermark and ownership verification method that remains reliable even under malicious perturbations. By leveraging conformal prediction, it defines two statistical measures—principal probability (PP) and watermark robustness (WR)—to evaluate model stability on benign versus watermarked samples. The authors derive certification conditions linking WR to a PP-based threshold and provide a high‑probability bound on false positives, enabling robust ownership verification when a suspicious model’s WR exceeds the PP values of benign models.
By Ting Qiao, Yiming Li, Jianbin Li, Yingjia Wang, Leyi Qi, Junfeng Guo, Ruili Feng, Dacheng Tao
arXiv:2608. 12876v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Detecting AI-generated images is only half the task: a deployed detector must also justify its verdict, yet existing detectors inherit three failure modes from their training data: real and fake images collected from different sources invite provenance shortcuts, supervised explanation corpora teach templated rationales, and a static forgery corpus leaves the decision boundary standing still while generators keep moving.
By Yicheng Bao, Xiahui Guo, Xuhong Wang, Xin Tan
arXiv:2607. 12354v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In this paper, we challenge the prevailing view that information dependency (including rote memorization) drives training data exposure to image reconstruction attacks.
By Rasmus Torp, Shailen K. Smith, Adam Breuer
The impressive visual quality and ubiquity of AI-generated images call for reliable and robust detection methods. Reconstruction-based detectors have emerged as a promising direction for transparent and training-free identification of synthetic images.
arXiv:2609.25017v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Deepfakes, synthetic audiovisual content produced by deep generative models, have escalated into a critical threat across civilian and military domains...
By Alexandros Gazis, Efstathios Karypidis, Kleanthi Santamouri, Theodoros Vavouras, Nikos E. Mastorakis, Stylianos Pappas
arXiv:2512.17730v2 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: Detectors of AI-generated images tend to inherit the biases of the data they are trained on: models fitted to GAN imagery learn to treat GAN-specif...
By Yichen Jiang, Mohammed Talha Alam, Sohail Ahmed Khan, Duc-Tien Dang-Nguyen, Fakhri Karray
arXiv:2609.14316v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Advances in image generation have made synthetic images increasingly difficult to distinguish from real photographs, raising concerns about the trustwo...
By Manni Cui, Ruiqi Liu, Zijian Yu, Hao Tan, Zibo Wei, Zian Wang, Ziheng Qin, Huijia Zhu, Weiqiang Wang, Jun Lan, Shu Wu
arXiv:2607. 03075v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety-critical applications require classifiers that are both robust and reliable.
By Nicolas Sournac, Ahmed Baha Ben Jmaa, Bertrand Braeckeveldt
The paper investigates whether pixels alone can determine an image’s origin—human, AI class, or specific generator—under adversarial edits. It establishes a minimax limit: the best possible robust acceptance gap equals the minimum total‑variation distance between the target distribution and attacked source distributions, independent of verifier design. The study also shows that practical public verifiers can fail before reaching this theoretical ceiling, highlighting the need to evaluate both statistical limits and deployed verifier behavior separately.
By Kai Yao