arXiv:2607. 17291v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Deep research agents increasingly operate over the open web, where relevant records coexist with redundant summaries, outdated reports, and misleading documents.
By Jun Nie, Zhiqin Yang, Zhenheng Tang, Yonggang Zhang, Xiaowen Chu, Xinmei Tian, Bo Han
arXiv:2608. 10676v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model (LLM)-based search agents answer questions through multi-step interactions with external environments.
By Aijun Yang, Qianxue Guo, Ziyi Huang, Yuxuan Chen, Shiyou Qian, Jian Cao
arXiv:2608. 04565v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM-based search agents are widely used for information-seeking tasks, but their reliance on external tool returns introduces a critical security risk: web content retrieved during execution is untrusted, exposing agents to prompt injection and goal hijacking.
By Xuebin Li, Hanqing Zhao, Siyuan Liang, Kejiang Chen, Weiming Zhang, Dacheng Tao, Nenghai Yu
arXiv:2606. 22737v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Before letting an agent operate over real context, can you prove it used the right evidence?
By Jeffrey Flynt
The paper investigates how large language model (LLM) search agents can be manipulated through repeated, coordinated search-result injections, a threat that extends beyond single-page poisoning. It introduces Authority‑Chain Hijack (ACH), a strategy that chains manipulated evidence across multiple sources, achieving high attack success rates on the SafeSearch benchmark. The authors also present Trace‑Guided Strategy Evolution (TGSE), an automated method that refines attacker strategies using execution traces, further improving success rates.
By Xuebin Li, Hanqing Zhao, Siyuan Liang, Kejiang Chen, Weiming Zhang, Dacheng Tao, Nenghai Yu
Large language model (LLM)-based search agents answer questions through multi-step interactions with external environments. However, providing complete execution trajectories to the LLM causes unbounded context growth and introduces noise.
The paper introduces GEO Defender, a two‑stage defense system designed to protect generative search engines from malicious Generative Engine Optimization (GEO) attacks that rewrite web documents to manipulate generated answers. GEO Defender comprises a Shield Reranker, which learns a defensive residual to demote GEO‑rewritten documents while maintaining relevance, and a Training‑Free Shield Generation component that creates a natural‑language library guiding the target LLM’s source usage during inference. Experiments on both closed‑source and open‑source large language models show that GEO Defender dramatically lowers attack success rates from 50.32% to 6.20%, preserves over 94% of benign evidence usage, and maintains answer quality while generalizing to unseen attacks.
By Haozhang Li, Yangguang Shao, Xinjie Lin, Zhong Guan, Mi Zhou, Junzheng Shi
arXiv:2606. 05241v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Public benchmarks enable fair and reproducible evaluation of LLM reasoning, but they become fragile for deep research agents that actively search the web during inference.
By Yongjie Wang, Xinyue Zhang, Kunhong Yao, Zhiwei Zeng, Kaisong Song, Jun Lin, Zhiqi Shen
arXiv:2607. 04718v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Deep research agents decompose open-ended queries into subtasks, retrieve web evidence over multiple rounds, and synthesize long-form reports.
By Yue Pan, Ziheng Zhang, Junxiang Lei, Changhao Jia, Qingyi Si, Hongcheng Guo
The paper introduces Retrieval-Grounded Voting (RGV), a new test-time scaling method for multi-turn search agents that retrieves and conditions on external documents. It identifies that confidence-based voting fails in this setting due to copy inflation, where tokens copied from retrieved documents inflate log probabilities and flatten confidence scores. RGV scores each rollout by lexical overlap between the final answer and retrieved documents, avoiding contaminated context and additional LLM calls, and achieves consistent accuracy gains across multiple benchmarks and models.
By Hyunho Kook, Junhyuk So, Tianyu Fu, Haizhong Zheng, Beidi Chen
Counter‑GEO‑Bench is a new benchmark that evaluates how well defenses can stop large language models from producing misinformation when faced with generative engine‑optimized (GEO) content. It contains 247 human‑verified queries paired with both information‑preserving and information‑distorting GEO rewrites, and measures attack success rate, false positives, and answer quality across three victim LLMs. The study shows that existing off‑the‑shelf defenses reduce attack success by at most 5.7 %, while a lightweight baseline called C‑GEO Guard cuts success by 47.6 % with minimal loss of utility.
By Bing Zheng, Zongyao Zhao, Wenming Yang
arXiv:2609.06027v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Search-augmented LLM agents are increasingly used for consumer decisions, making them vulnerable to Generative Engine Optimization (GEO) poisoning. E...
By Zhongan Bi, Qiwen Wang, Jianrong Jiang, Jigang Ding, Wenwen Xiong, Changhua Meng, Xuanang Gao, Kepeng Lin, Changjiang Jiang, Yiang Chen, Huan Yao, Wei Wang, Zhenyu Ma, Wenhui Dong