arXiv:2609.02316v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Generative engine optimization (GEO) enables content producers to increase the visibility of their web pages in generative search engines, but the sa...
arXiv:2605. 29107v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) increasingly rank products, documents, and recommendations for user queries, which makes manipulating these rankings a growing concern for fairness and information integrity.
arXiv:2608. 16824v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Generative Engine Optimization (GEO) modifies web content to increase its likelihood of being selected and cited by generative search engines.
arXiv:2607. 26339v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems ground large language models (LLMs) in external corpora, but this reliance exposes them to corpus poisoning: maliciously injected passages that manipulate retrieved evidence.
arXiv:2607. 20730v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models increasingly use search tools to retrieve up-to-date information, introducing a new attack surface in which retrieved documents can be manipulated.
Safety benchmarks for large language models often assess the risk of a user query, although the outcome of question answering depends on whether the response violates a policy. This distinction is cri...
arXiv:2606. 28356v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Generative Engine Optimization (GEO) lets content owners rewrite web content to increase their visibility in generative systems.
RAGSentinel is a training‑free, label‑free defense designed for black‑box retrieval‑augmented generation systems. It employs a surrogate encoder to detect hidden‑state shifts caused by retrieved documents, removes shared topic directions, and filters poisoned documents as geometric outliers from a robust majority consensus. The method is proven to recover a poison‑free majority context under honest‑majority and representation‑separation assumptions, and experiments show it keeps attack success rates low while maintaining accuracy across multiple datasets, LLM families, and adaptive attacks.
Large language models (LLMs) are rigorously aligned to refuse harmful requests, a process that inherently cultivates a latent capacity to evaluate and recognize unsafe content. In this work, we reveal that this advanced safety awareness inadvertently introduces a fatal vulnerability.
arXiv:2603. 00801v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Language agents increasingly act as web-enabled systems that search, browse, and synthesize information from diverse sources.
arXiv:2609.01210v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety benchmarks for large language models often assess the risk of a user query, although the outcome of question answering depends on whether the...
arXiv:2608. 28389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) augments LLMs with external documents, but public or user-editable sources expose RAG systems to data poisoning: attackers can inject malicious documents to steer outputs toward targeted answers.