arXiv:2603. 10044v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: A safety score earned on a benchmark need not predict how the same model behaves once it is wrapped in an agentic scaffold the benchmark never tested.
arXiv:2606. 08529v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Published agent capability scores conflate what a model can do with what its scaffold lets it do, and the magnitude of this elicitation gap is not well characterized under controlled conditions.
arXiv:2608. 02665v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A benchmark score is a measurement instrument, yet most benchmarks read each item at a single canonical surface form.
Agent evaluations tell us that a model picked the wrong tool, but rarely why. We introduce canary tools: diagnostic probe tools planted in an agent's Model Context Protocol (MCP) tool set, each engineered to probe one specific tool-selection weakness.
arXiv:2607. 22585v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Public leaderboards for coding agents typically rank systems by model name and pass rate, while the surrounding harness (the scaffold that issues tools, manages context, and decides when to stop) is often under-specified.
arXiv:2608. 04719v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agent evaluations tell us that a model picked the wrong tool, but rarely why.
arXiv:2606. 11686v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: End-to-end task-success is the dominant way to evaluate LLM agents, but one aggregate number tells you that an agent regressed, not where.
arXiv:2607. 07097v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety evaluations of multi-agent LLM systems often compare a direct prompt with a planner-executor pipeline and report the difference as a single "pipeline effect.
arXiv:2607. 28685v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agent-safety benchmarks measure different behaviors, and their scores get quoted interchangeably as an agent's safety.
arXiv:2606. 25097v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Speculative decoding accelerates inference by letting a draft model propose tokens for a target model to verify, raising a concrete safety question: at temperature zero, can draft-side behavior leak into safety-scored outputs?
arXiv:2605. 27898v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: As LLMs are increasingly deployed as agents, reliable assessment of their agentic capabilities has become essential.
End-to-end task-success is the dominant way to evaluate LLM agents, but one aggregate number tells you that an agent regressed, not where. We present layer-isolated evaluation: a deployed ordering agent is decomposed into a fixed taxonomy of layers (ontology, intent, routing, decomposition, escalation, safety, memory, and cross-cutting envelope/defense), each exercised by its own assertion slice in a deterministic, no-LLM "pure" mode.
arXiv:2608. 08542v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Model merging has become the default way to give an aligned language model new skills without retraining: a practitioner folds task vectors from math, code, or domain specialists into a safety-aligned base using task arithmetic, TIES, or DARE.