arXiv:2606. 28639v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We establish the mathematical limits of AGI safety in two forms: verifying a fixed system, and verifying that a certified safety property persists once the system self-modifies.
arXiv:2606. 28639v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This article establishes the foundational mathematical limits of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) safety, proving that the core barrier is not the impossibility of an aligned state, but its structural unverifiability.
arXiv:2606. 26057v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents are granted access to tools, APIs, and other infrastructure, making them active principals in those systems.
arXiv:2606. 26406v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We propose a complete architectural blueprint for safe artificial general intelligence based on a closed reentry loop (D I cycle).
arXiv:2607. 13070v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety claims on self-improving agent runtimes are almost always self-graded: a policy file, a guardrail, or a README commitment.
arXiv:2607. 22868v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Runtime guardrails act before irreversible tool calls, but their guarantees depend on what policy state is representable, what a judge observes, and whether intervention changes future behavior.
arXiv:2602. 20064v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models are increasingly deployed as agents: they plan, call tools, read untrusted data, and act on the results.
arXiv:2607. 13070v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safety claims for self-improving agent runtimes are almost always self-graded: a policy file, a guardrail, a promise in a README.
Shielded reinforcement learning is typically presented as a runtime safety mechanism that compiles temporal-logic specifications into automata restricting an agent's actions. We argue this is the wrong product.
arXiv:2608. 15147v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Machine intelligence has conquered the symbolic world but stalled at the physical one.
arXiv:2606. 13621v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Shielded reinforcement learning is typically presented as a runtime safety mechanism that compiles temporal-logic specifications into automata restricting an agent's actions.
arXiv:2607. 08054v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly trusted to draft the artifacts of safety analysis such as, losses, hazards, Unsafe Control Actions (UCAs), and safety constraints, inside rigorous processes such as Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA).
arXiv:2606. 17529v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Scientific machine-learning (SciML) surrogates approximate expensive simulations, but exact expected outputs for arbitrary inputs are unavailable (the oracle problem).