arXiv:2607. 20473v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly released as open-weight models with safeguards against harmful requests.
arXiv:2606. 07963v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Backdoor attacks in large language models (LLMs) are often treated as isolated trigger-response failures, motivating defenses tailored to specific triggers or behaviors.
arXiv:2606. 25182v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Jailbreak attacks reveal a persistent weakness in aligned Large Language Models: carefully crafted prompts can elicit policy-violating responses despite safety training.
arXiv:2508. 10029v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safety-aligned large language models can still be manipulated through white-box interventions that modify their internal representations.
arXiv:2605. 00123v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Safety trained large language models (LLMs) can often be induced to answer harmful requests through jailbreak prompts.
Large language models (LLMs) are rigorously aligned to refuse harmful requests, a process that inherently cultivates a latent capacity to evaluate and recognize unsafe content. In this work, we reveal that this advanced safety awareness inadvertently introduces a fatal vulnerability.
arXiv:2510. 22014v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Discrete optimization-based jailbreaking attacks on large language models aim to generate short, nonsensical suffixes that, when appended onto input prompts, elicit disallowed content.
arXiv:2606. 24267v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: While in-context learning is generally shown to be effective in Large Language Models (LLMs), bad contexts can cause performance degradation and mode collapse, a phenomenon we call "pigeonholing.
arXiv:2606. 24267v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: While in-context learning is generally shown to be effective in Large Language Models (LLMs), bad contexts can cause performance degradation and mode collapse, a phenomenon we call "pigeonholing.
arXiv:2607. 01859v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety training for large language models (LLMs) is conducted predominantly in English, leaving uncertain how well safety mechanisms generalize to low-resource languages and mixed-language code-switching.
arXiv:2608.30585v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models are trained to follow instructions while refusing harmful requests. Jailbreaks exploit this balance to elicit content a model wou...
arXiv:2606. 12747v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety-relevant studies of language models, including alignment and jailbreaking evaluations and AI control protocols, often rely on prefilling model outputs.
arXiv:2606. 28153v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Jailbreak attacks bypass LLM safety alignment, yet their mechanisms remain poorly understood.