arXiv:2606. 25182v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Jailbreak attacks reveal a persistent weakness in aligned Large Language Models: carefully crafted prompts can elicit policy-violating responses despite safety training.
arXiv:2606. 28153v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Jailbreak attacks bypass LLM safety alignment, yet their mechanisms remain poorly understood.
arXiv:2508. 10029v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safety-aligned large language models can still be manipulated through white-box interventions that modify their internal representations.
arXiv:2604. 23130v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Jailbreak attacks expose a persistent failure mode in safety-aligned LLMs: models can be pushed into harmful behavior, but the internal representations enabling this shift remain poorly localized.
arXiv:2607. 07903v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities but remain highly vulnerable to adversarial prompts and jailbreak attacks.
arXiv:2512. 14751v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Finetuning pretrained large language models (LLMs) has become the standard paradigm for developing downstream applications.
arXiv:2605. 00123v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Safety trained large language models (LLMs) can often be induced to answer harmful requests through jailbreak prompts.
arXiv:2605. 07032v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The evolution of generative models from next-token predictors to autonomous engines of complex systems necessitates rigorous safety hardening.
arXiv:2509. 03985v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: In deployment and application, large language models (LLMs) typically undergo safety alignment to prevent illegal and unethical outputs.
Large language models (LLMs) are rigorously aligned to refuse harmful requests, a process that inherently cultivates a latent capacity to evaluate and recognize unsafe content. In this work, we reveal that this advanced safety awareness inadvertently introduces a fatal vulnerability.
arXiv:2602. 12418v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Jailbreak attacks remain a persistent threat to large language model safety.
As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time. We ask whether a defender can recover such a trigger under realistic affordances, namely white-box access to the weights and knowledge of the behavior of concern, but no training data, no trusted reference model, no knowledge of the trigger, and no certainty that the model is poisoned.
arXiv:2607. 23496v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety-aligned large language models are trained to refuse harmful requests, yet embedding the same requests in particular scenarios can bypass their safeguards.