arXiv AI

FedGraph: Defending Federated Large Language Model Fine-Tuning Against Backdoor Attacks via Graph-Based Aggregation

FedGraph is a graph-based aggregation framework designed to defend federated large language model fine-tuning against backdoor attacks. It exploits the observation that malicious clients produce consistently similar updates, while benign clients generate diverse ones, by modeling client updates as nodes in a dynamically constructed graph and extracting structural features. The resulting compact client representations enable effective identification and suppression of malicious contributions, achieving high detection accuracy and low false positives in extensive experiments.

arXiv AI
Jul 23

FedLSG: LLM-Enhanced Semantic Calibration for Federated Graph Backdoor Defense

arXiv:2607. 19674v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Federated Graph Neural Networks (FedGNNs) are highly vulnerable to backdoor poisoning, yet existing defenses typically rely on rule-based approaches that lack semantic understanding, making them vulnerable to stealthy triggers and harmful to benign structures.

By Chenyu Zhou, Yabin Peng, Wei Huang, Kunlin Li, Shuaishuai Zhang, Xinyuan Miao
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 23

FedNIA: Noise-Induced Activation Analysis for Mitigating Data Poisoning in Federated Learning

FedNIA is a defense framework for federated learning that identifies and excludes malicious clients without needing a central test dataset. It works by injecting random noise inputs and analyzing layerwise activation patterns with an autoencoder to detect abnormal behaviors caused by data poisoning. The method can counter various attack types—including sample poisoning, label flipping, and backdoors—even when multiple attackers collaborate, and shows strong performance on non‑iid federated datasets.

By Ehsan Hallaji, Roozbeh Razavi-Far, Mehrdad Saif
arXiv Machine Learning
Aug 20

FedLNS: Leverage LayerNorm Signature Modeling to Mitigate Adversarial Manipulation in Federated LLMs

FedLNS is a server‑side framework that screens federated learning updates by representing each client’s contribution through changes in trainable normalization‑layer parameters, creating lightweight signatures that can be compared against a history‑aware cross‑client reference. The method requires no extra client‑to‑server communication, raw data, or labeled attack examples, and after screening, the remaining full‑model updates are aggregated with standard federated learning rules. Experiments on GPT‑style, BERT‑style, and LLaMA‑style models with 200 clients demonstrate that FedLNS achieves lower test perplexity than six baselines even when 40% of the population performs target manipulation under both IID and non‑IID data partitions.

By Kai Li, Jong-Ik Park, Carlee Joe-Wong, Wei Ni, Falko Dressler
arXiv Machine Learning
Oct 12

Byzantine-Resilient Federated Large Language Model via Hypergraph Message Passing

The paper introduces a Byzantine‑resilient federated large language model (FedLLM) that uses a Hypergraph Message Passing Graph Autoencoder (HMP‑GAE) to prevent semantically corrupted updates from spreading during aggregation. By representing low‑rank model updates as hypergraph nodes and iteratively passing messages, HMP‑GAE jointly maximizes global accuracy and suppresses malicious updates without accessing private data. Experiments on AG News and Yahoo! Answers with Qwen‑2.5 and Llama‑3.2 backbones show significant gains: 1.21% higher accuracy, 44.08% lower semantic entropy, and 13.34% reduced perplexity compared to existing defenses.

By Kai Li, Hanlin Cai, Zihao Liu, Yichen Li, Jose Alcaraz Calero, Wei Ni, Falko Dressler, \"Ozg\"ur B. Akan
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 25

BRFID: Toward Byzantine-Robust Federated Intrusion Detection

The paper investigates the effects of label‑flipping poisoning attacks in a three‑client federated intrusion detection system (IDS) trained on CICIDS2017 with non‑IID attack subtype distributions. Flipping 60% of training labels from a single Byzantine client reduces the attacker’s own detection accuracy from 99.96% to 84.33%, while the federated global ensemble remains stable across all tested poison rates. The study shows that the self‑compromise signal can be detected as an anomaly, enabling Byzantine client identification without target data exfiltration, and notes that the current aggregation uses a Federated Forest rather than FedAvg, with future work planned to extend to parametric classifiers.

By Asmah Muallem, Firdous Kausar, Sajid Hussain, Lei Qian