arXiv AI

The Formalism Trap: Are LLM-as-a-Judge Evaluators Blinded by Consensus Mimicry under Social Load?

arXiv:2607. 28641v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We introduce the \textit{Agentic Formalism Trap} and the Evaluative Dissonance Index ($D_E$), quantifying how LLM-as-a-Judge systems conflate structural proceduralism with semantic truth under adversarial load.

arXiv AI
Jul 7

Agentic and Generative AI for Open-Source Intelligence and Cyber Investigations: Taxonomy, Evaluation, Challenges, and Future Directions

arXiv:2607. 03233v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The rapid growth of publicly available digital information has rendered manual open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysis insufficient for modern intelligence, cybersecurity, and cyber investigation.

By Eduardo Almeida Palmieri, Mohamed Chahine Ghanem, Dipo Dunsin, Zubair Baig, Ed de Quincey, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo
arXiv AI
Jun 8

EVA: Evolving Semantic Adversaries for Red-Teaming GUI Agents Against Environmental Injection Attacks

arXiv:2505. 14289v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Graphical User Interface (GUI) agents powered by Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed yet vulnerable to Environmental Injection Attacks (EIAs).

By Yijie Lu, Manman Zhao, Tianjie Ju, Zihe Yan, Xinbei Ma, Yuan Guo, Daizong Ding, Gongshen Liu, Zhuosheng Zhang
arXiv AI
Jun 4

Cascading Hallucination in Agentic RAG: The CHARM Framework for Detection and Mitigation

arXiv:2606. 04435v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Multi-step agentic retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) pipelines have demonstrated significant capability for complex reasoning tasks, yet remain vulnerable to a class of failure that existing hallucination detection mechanisms systematically miss: cascading hallucination, where errors introduced at early pipeline stages propagate and amplify across successive reasoning steps, producing confident but factually incorrect final outputs.

By Saroj Mishra
arXiv AI
Jul 31

Adversarial Pragmatics for AI Safety Evaluation: A Diagnostic Framework and Seed Benchmark for Language-Mediated Control

arXiv:2607. 01153v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safety evaluations for language models increasingly depend on judgments about ambiguous natural-language behaviour: whether a model followed an instruction, refused appropriately, complied with a policy, or misreported progress in an agentic task.

By Brett Reynolds