PVBRF-ID is a two‑server federated learning protocol designed for oilfield enterprise networks that balances privacy and Byzantine robustness. It uses secret‑sharing of model updates, joint norm and cosine‑similarity checks against a clean root set, and cryptographic commitments to make accepted updates publicly verifiable. Experiments on a 15‑class Edge‑IIoT dataset show that PVBRF‑ID matches standard FedAvg on clean data, resists sign‑flip and adaptive poisoning attacks, and protects against update‑inference attacks while still allowing backdoor detection.
arXiv:2610.27357v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Byzantine-robust aggregation shields federated learning from malicious updates, but the rules that filter out suspect updates do so by comparing clie...
The paper investigates how privacy guarantees, robustness to Byzantine attacks, and detection coverage for rare intrusion types interact in federated network intrusion detection systems. It introduces geometric indistinguishability to explain how privacy noise can obscure minority-class signals, and demonstrates through experiments on UNSW‑NB15 that combining differential privacy with robust aggregation can disproportionately harm detection of rare attacks. The study highlights that these properties cannot be treated as independently composable and calls for aggregation‑aware modeling and sample‑aware evaluation to build trustworthy federated NIDS.
arXiv:2610.20264v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Client-level fair federated learning, in the form of $q$-fair federated learning ($q$-FFL), agnostic federated learning, or tilted empirical risk minim...
The paper investigates the effects of label‑flipping poisoning attacks in a three‑client federated intrusion detection system (IDS) trained on CICIDS2017 with non‑IID attack subtype distributions. Flipping 60% of training labels from a single Byzantine client reduces the attacker’s own detection accuracy from 99.96% to 84.33%, while the federated global ensemble remains stable across all tested poison rates. The study shows that the self‑compromise signal can be detected as an anomaly, enabling Byzantine client identification without target data exfiltration, and notes that the current aggregation uses a Federated Forest rather than FedAvg, with future work planned to extend to parametric classifiers.
arXiv:2611.05546v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Decentralized federated learning (DFL) eliminates the central aggregation server but remains vulnerable to data heterogeneity, Byzantine attacks, and c...
The paper introduces FGLGuard, a privacy‑preserving federated graph learning framework that trains a graph attention detector on each operator’s own multi‑agent system (MAS) episode graphs, sharing only model updates. By combining a proximal local objective, domain‑balanced aggregation, threshold calibration, and guarded rewrite mechanisms, FGLGuard adapts to non‑IID data across organizations and outperforms centralized and local‑only baselines on Agent‑SafetyBench, R‑Judge, and AgentDojo. The method achieves significant reductions in attack success rates—up to 43% on AgentDojo—without compromising utility, API cost, or model capability.
arXiv:2608. 01095v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Federated learning (FL) enables multiple intelligent devices to collaboratively train a high-accuracy model without sharing raw data.
The paper investigates privacy and integrity risks in federated fine‑tuning of a pretrained MobileNetV4 model on Quick, Draw! data. It shows that a single client update can reveal private labels, that label‑count recovery degrades with more clients, and that backdoor and label‑flipping attacks can succeed under FedAvg but are mitigated by FLTrust. The study also demonstrates a live poisoning session using Indigma’s FedMaestro orchestrator.
arXiv:2604. 12431v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Organisations increasingly outsource privacy-sensitive data transformations to cloud providers, yet no practical mechanism lets the data owner verify that the contracted algorithm was faithfully executed.
Giskard is a scalable protocol for private and Byzantine‑robust decentralized aggregation in large‑scale learning. It organizes participants into a tree of committees of size O(log n) and computes a differentially private coordinate‑wise approximate median using secure multi‑party computation within each committee. Experiments with up to one million participants show that Giskard reduces per‑party communication by nearly three orders of magnitude compared to its closest competitors while maintaining robustness against up to n/4 Byzantine parties.
arXiv:2607. 06612v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Federated Learning (FL) enables multiple clients to collaboratively train machine learning models while retaining data locality, thereby enhancing user privacy.
arXiv:2606. 03430v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) deployed in energy infrastructure are vulnerable to model theft attacks, which allow adversaries to create evasive traffic offline.