arXiv AI By Saheed A. Tijani, Frank Jiang, Ming Liu

LiBRA: Logit Fingerprints for Byzantine-Robust Client Selection in Federated Learning

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arXiv Machine Learning
Oct 12

PVBRF-ID: Private, Verifiable and Byzantine-Robust Federated Intrusion Detection for Oilfield Enterprise Networks

PVBRF-ID is a two‑server federated learning protocol designed for oilfield enterprise networks that balances privacy and Byzantine robustness. It uses secret‑sharing of model updates, joint norm and cosine‑similarity checks against a clean root set, and cryptographic commitments to make accepted updates publicly verifiable. Experiments on a 15‑class Edge‑IIoT dataset show that PVBRF‑ID matches standard FedAvg on clean data, resists sign‑flip and adaptive poisoning attacks, and protects against update‑inference attacks while still allowing backdoor detection.

By Mustafa S. Aljumaily, Ali Ataeemh Allami, Mustafa N. Mnati, Nawar S. Alseelawi, Shahab Abdulla
arXiv Machine Learning
Aug 20

FedLNS: Leverage LayerNorm Signature Modeling to Mitigate Adversarial Manipulation in Federated LLMs

FedLNS is a server‑side framework that screens federated learning updates by representing each client’s contribution through changes in trainable normalization‑layer parameters, creating lightweight signatures that can be compared against a history‑aware cross‑client reference. The method requires no extra client‑to‑server communication, raw data, or labeled attack examples, and after screening, the remaining full‑model updates are aggregated with standard federated learning rules. Experiments on GPT‑style, BERT‑style, and LLaMA‑style models with 200 clients demonstrate that FedLNS achieves lower test perplexity than six baselines even when 40% of the population performs target manipulation under both IID and non‑IID data partitions.

By Kai Li, Jong-Ik Park, Carlee Joe-Wong, Wei Ni, Falko Dressler
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 25

BRFID: Toward Byzantine-Robust Federated Intrusion Detection

The paper investigates the effects of label‑flipping poisoning attacks in a three‑client federated intrusion detection system (IDS) trained on CICIDS2017 with non‑IID attack subtype distributions. Flipping 60% of training labels from a single Byzantine client reduces the attacker’s own detection accuracy from 99.96% to 84.33%, while the federated global ensemble remains stable across all tested poison rates. The study shows that the self‑compromise signal can be detected as an anomaly, enabling Byzantine client identification without target data exfiltration, and notes that the current aggregation uses a Federated Forest rather than FedAvg, with future work planned to extend to parametric classifiers.

By Asmah Muallem, Firdous Kausar, Sajid Hussain, Lei Qian