arXiv Machine Learning

On Identifying Adversarial Intent Injection in AI-Native 6G Networks

The paper introduces a threat model for malicious intent injection in AI‑native 6G networks and examines four injection strategies: stealth‑mode, random distribution, increasing frequency, and decreasing frequency. It proposes a dual‑path detection framework combining a CNN with TF‑IDF features for supervised detection and an AutoEncoder trained on benign data for one‑class detection. Evaluation shows the framework achieves higher accuracy (0.97) and F1‑score (0.98) than the state‑of‑the‑art baseline.

arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 17

A GAN-Based Framework for Robust DDoS Attack Detection

The paper introduces a GAN‑based framework for detecting DDoS attacks that are designed to evade traditional security systems. It combines Random Forests, Deep Neural Ensembles, and Transformer models trained on the CICDDoS2019 dataset with synthetic adversarial traffic generated by a WGAN‑GP. Experiments show that this hybrid training significantly improves detection accuracy and resilience against unseen adversarial traffic, and real‑world tests confirm its practical effectiveness.

By Makram Chehayeb, Walid Fahs, Amina Rizk, Rida Khatoun, Omran Berjawi
arXiv AI
Oct 2

UniGuardian: A Unified Defense for Detecting Prompt Injection, Backdoor Attacks and Adversarial Attacks in Large Language Models

UniGuardian is a training‑free detector for large language models that jointly identifies prompt injection, backdoor, and adversarial attacks—collectively called Prompt Trigger Attacks (PTA). It measures how structured prompt perturbations shift the model’s output distribution and uses a single‑forward strategy to detect attacks while generating text in a shared batched forward pass. Experiments show that UniGuardian accurately and efficiently identifies trigger‑activated prompts in LLMs.

By Huawei Lin, Yingjie Lao, Tony Geng, Tan Yu, Weijie Zhao
arXiv Machine Learning
Aug 31

REPLICANT: Learning Policies for Evading and Hardening Malware Detectors

The paper introduces Replicant, a deep reinforcement learning framework that learns to evade malware detectors under a strict label‑only black‑box threat model. Replicant generates reusable policies for modifying malware samples and deciding when to query the target, and it transfers across different samples, detectors, and feature spaces. In experiments on seven Android malware detectors and three feature spaces, Replicant achieves a mean attack success rate of 78.8%, outperforming state‑of‑the‑art methods by 20.9%–39.2% and providing a stronger signal for adversarial training to harden detectors.

By Shae McFadden, Ilias Tsingenopoulos, Mario D'Onghia, Alexander Herzog, Myles Foley, Chris Hicks, Lorenzo Cavallaro, Fabio Pierazzi