arXiv:2605. 24696v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Streaming intrusion detection systems must process flows continuously under bounded memory, yet most leave alerting-threshold selection as a post-hoc tuning problem incompatible with production, where operators commit in advance to alert budgets, misclassification costs, and Service Level Objectives.
arXiv:2510.09619v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: [Corrected v2: an audit found that the score, threshold, and latency descriptions below are not what the shared codebase implements, and that...
arXiv:2606. 20502v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Whether LLMs scoring well on vulnerability benchmarks genuinely reason about security or merely pattern-match on contaminated data remains unresolved.
The paper investigates how to properly validate candidate models before promoting them to replace incumbent classifiers in adaptive network intrusion detection systems. It demonstrates that promotion decisions can be biased by how challengers are constructed and the amount of evidence they receive, and that using self‑contained challenger pipelines and sufficient candidate evidence reduces apparent promotion harm. The study also shows that policy rankings shift with candidate comparability and that no single update policy dominates across benchmarks.
arXiv:2607. 13203v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: False alarms remain a major barrier to deploying network intrusion detection systems (NIDS).
The paper introduces a claim‑safe protocol for evaluating closed‑loop AI systems, consisting of three actions: Refuse, Decompose, and Refresh. It demonstrates the protocol in a simulator with 24 policy components and 1,440 held‑out cases, showing that abstention and stable false admission rates are low while providing detailed statistical diagnostics. The approach emphasizes that evaluation results should be tied to observable support and statistical calibration rather than a single PASS/FAIL label.
arXiv:2606. 11949v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We present an online monitoring system for distributional shift in deployed safety classifiers, using calibrated sequential statistics to detect when a classifier has moved out of distribution.
The paper demonstrates that the way evaluation streams are assembled in streaming intrusion‑detection benchmarks—by interleaving, pooling, or replaying network captures—acts as an uncontrolled experimental variable that can significantly alter performance metrics. In the CICIDS2017 benchmark, reordering the same set of records under a fixed split changes the held‑out samples’ overlap, prevalence, and even reverses the ranking of two deterministic scorers. Similar effects are observed in the LITNET‑2020 benchmark, where pooling disjoint captures yields a single operating point that masks large variations in per‑capture prevalences, and minor changes in batch composition can shift reported AUC‑PR values by a few thousandths.
arXiv:2608. 05199v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Autonomous security agents operate as staged pipelines, such as classifying network traffic and then attributing attacks to a specific technique.
arXiv:2606. 15964v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Foundation models are now used in settings where the prompts they receive can change quickly.
arXiv:2606. 06261v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: O-RAN enables a disaggregated baseband stack with programmable functions that communicate over standardized open interfaces.
Online Conformal Anomaly Detection with Prediction-Powered Data Acquisition introduces C-PP-COAD, a framework that uses synthetic calibration data to reduce reliance on real-world calibration while maintaining assumption-free false discovery rate control. The method wraps any anomaly detection algorithm, converting its scores into conformal p-values for online testing. Experiments on synthetic and real datasets—including thyroid dysfunction, O‑RAN conflict, 5G intrusion, and UE throughput degradation—show that C-PP-COAD preserves FDR guarantees while significantly cutting the need for real calibration data.
arXiv:2609.15017v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Prompt-injection detectors are typically evaluated using aggregate F1 on in-distribution test data, which offers limited insight into behavior under...