arXiv:2606. 11949v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We present an online monitoring system for distributional shift in deployed safety classifiers, using calibrated sequential statistics to detect when a classifier has moved out of distribution.
arXiv:2608. 14089v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety classifiers deployed with large language models often fail for two reasons: their decisions reflect the policy learned during training rather than the deployer's desired policy, and their performance degrades as deployment traffic evolves.
arXiv:2607. 26574v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety classifiers ("guards") are the dominant black-box defense for vision-language models, yet they judge an input's surface form, not its meaning: a harmful request re-encoded as set theory, formal logic, a rare language, code, or an image of text slips past a guard that would block it in plain language -- the decode gap.
arXiv:2607. 01679v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Adversarial attacks on cybersecurity classifiers pose a dual threat: degrading predictions and destabilising the SHAP-based explanations that security analysts rely on to understand and triage alerts.
arXiv:2512. 19011v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safety classifiers that screen LLM inputs for jailbreak attempts have become standard deployment components, yet almost all production systems rely on GPU-based models: fine-tuned transformers and LLM-as-a-judge pipelines.
arXiv:2605. 24696v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Streaming intrusion detection systems must process flows continuously under bounded memory, yet most leave alerting-threshold selection as a post-hoc tuning problem incompatible with production, where operators commit in advance to alert budgets, misclassification costs, and Service Level Objectives.
arXiv:2607. 12792v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Jailbreak-robustness research typically evaluates safety through generated responses using an LLM-as-judge approach.
arXiv:2602. 14161v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Detecting prompt injection, jailbreak attacks, and harmful requests is critical for deploying LLM-based agents safely, yet current evaluation practices in this literature overestimate generalization.
arXiv:2505. 04608v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Responsibly deploying artificial intelligence (AI) / machine learning (ML) systems in high-stakes settings arguably requires not only proof of system reliability, but also continual, post-deployment monitoring to quickly detect and address any unsafe behavior.
arXiv:2505. 14300v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: White-box monitoring is increasingly adopted as an auditing tool as Large Language Models (LLMs) are deployed in daily operations to ensure safe model behavior.
arXiv:2606. 20502v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Whether LLMs scoring well on vulnerability benchmarks genuinely reason about security or merely pattern-match on contaminated data remains unresolved.
arXiv:2607. 22545v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Deploying large language models in financial-services and agentic settings requires safety classifiers that simultaneously handle prompt injection, regulatory compliance, and general harm, a combination no existing open guardrail addresses in a single inference pass.
arXiv:2606. 01746v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Modern neural networks are highly susceptible to adversarial perturbations.