arXiv:2603.18740v3 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: Automated Code Review (ACR) systems integrating Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly adopted in software development workflows, rang...
By Dimitris Mitropoulos, Nikolaos Alexopoulos, Georgios Alexopoulos, Diomidis Spinellis
The paper introduces CodeScan, a black-box, vulnerability-oriented scanning framework designed to detect data poisoning and backdoor attacks in code generation large language models (LLMs). CodeScan operates by analyzing structural similarities across multiple code generations, normalizing them with abstract syntax tree (AST) techniques, and then applying LLM-based vulnerability analysis to identify recurring insecure patterns. Evaluations on 117 models across three architectures and multiple sizes show over 97% detection accuracy with fewer false positives compared to prior methods.
By Shenao Yan, Shan Jin, Shimaa Ahmed, Sunpreet Singh Arora, Yiwei Cai, Yizhen Wang, Yuan Hong
arXiv:2609.13816v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: JavaScript powers approximately 98.8% of all websites, making vulnerabilities in its code a significant security risk, yet existing detection approac...
By Manit Kaushik, Ishir Bhardwaj, Pranav Gupta, Pankaj Jalote, Arun Balaji Buduru
arXiv:2607. 23496v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety-aligned large language models are trained to refuse harmful requests, yet embedding the same requests in particular scenarios can bypass their safeguards.
By Ziheng Peng, Huiqi Deng, Haoran Jing, Xuankun Rong, Jiahui Han, Xiting Wang, Na Zou, Xia Hu
arXiv:2607. 23088v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely used for code generation, yet their security behavior in realistic development workflows remains underexplored.
By Lixun Ma, Ruolong Ma, Bei Wang, Feng Wei, Zhenguang Liu, Lorenzo Cavallaro, Wentao Chen
The paper introduces CodePoisonRAG, a framework that poisons retrieval-augmented code generation systems by transforming benign code artifacts into malicious ones. It injects CWE-specific vulnerabilities and false safety claims into a single task-matched artifact, achieving high success rates across multiple generators and even against a defense system. The study demonstrates that attackers can target and propagate specific weaknesses without altering the underlying language model.
By Varun Gadey, Ziad Marey, Alexandra Dmitrienko
Safety-aligned large language models are trained to refuse harmful requests, yet embedding the same requests in particular scenarios can bypass their safeguards. Existing red-teaming methods empirically identify effective scenarios through observed attack outcomes, but why particular scenarios weaken refusal remains mechanistically unclear.
Software vulnerability remediation is a cognitively demanding task that requires specialized security expertise often lacking in general developers. In the meantime, Large Language Models (LLMs) assisted tools show potential in vulnerability detection, location, and repair tasks.
arXiv:2608.30025v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) frequently generate source code containing vulnerabilities, yet little work studies the internal mechanisms that distingui...
By Hao Yan, Ziyu Yao
arXiv:2608. 10530v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) have undergone a shift from stateless conversational interfaces to autonomous agents capable of multi-step planning, tool invocation, code execution, and maintaining persistent memory.
By Md Jafrin Hossain, Mohammad Arif Hossain, Nirwan Ansari
arXiv:2407.02395v3 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for program synthesis, yet they often generate code that is functionally plausible but ins...
By Jiexin Wang, Liuwen Cao, Xitong Luo, Yang Cao, Zhenghao Li, Yunyi Xiao, Mengchen Zhao, Adam Jatowt, Yi Cai
The paper introduces the Static‑Pass Dynamic‑Fail (SPDF) phenomenon, showing that static analysis can miss vulnerabilities that are exploitable at runtime. Using a three‑stage pipeline—static scanning, LLM‑driven CWE reasoning, and autonomous exploit verification—it evaluated 1,355 Python samples and found that 14.53% of samples that passed static checks were actually exploitable. The study highlights that static‑analysis success and runtime security are distinct assurance layers, especially for AI‑generated and security‑sensitive code.
By Jessica Pourleyli, Maitreyee Das Urmi, Glaucia Melo