arXiv AI

When AI Agrees Too Much: Manipulating Automated Code Review via Bias Injection

arXiv AI
Aug 18

Workspace Topology as an Attack Vector in Agentic Coding Assistants

arXiv:2608. 14876v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic coding assistants are finding widespread use, not just in new code development but in quickly ingesting and leveraging third-party code.

By Alexandre G. R. Day, Pradeep Yadlapalli, Sriram Venkatapathy, Thomas Paniagua, Nick Raines, Sahil Wadhwa, Himanshu Kumar, Andy Luo, Sudeep Panyam, Rikhiya Ghosh, Pranab Mohanty, Giri Iyengar
arXiv AI
Aug 5

AgenticSCR: An Autonomous Agentic Secure Code Review for Immature Vulnerabilities Detection

arXiv:2601. 19138v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Secure code review is critical during pre-integration, where Atlassian developers rely on lightweight analysis tools, while deep security assessment is deferred to later stages, delaying feedback and increasing remediation costs.

By Wachiraphan Charoenwet, Kla Tantithamthavorn, Patanamon Thongtanunam, Hong Yi Lin, Minwoo Jeong, Ming Wu
arXiv AI
Oct 12

Auditing Prompt Injection Defenses Before They Reach Users: What Strong Adversaries Reveal

The paper examines how fine‑tuned defenses against prompt injection in large language models can be audited before deployment. By leveraging intermediate checkpoints from the fine‑tuning process, the authors create strong optimization‑based attacks (e.g., GCG and BEAST) that dramatically increase attack success rates—from near zero to up to 96%—against state‑of‑the‑art defenses. This demonstrates that current empirical evaluations often overestimate robustness and that pre‑deployment stress‑testing can uncover real vulnerabilities.

By Xiaoxue Yang, Bozhidar Stevanoski, Matthieu Meeus, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 3

CodePoisonRAG: Knowledge Poisoning Attacks on Retrieval-Augmented Code Generation

The paper introduces CodePoisonRAG, a framework that poisons retrieval-augmented code generation systems by transforming benign code artifacts into malicious ones. It injects CWE-specific vulnerabilities and false safety claims into a single task-matched artifact, achieving high success rates across multiple generators and even against a defense system. The study demonstrates that attackers can target and propagate specific weaknesses without altering the underlying language model.

By Varun Gadey, Ziad Marey, Alexandra Dmitrienko