arXiv:2607. 23394v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Recent work shows that fine-tuning language models on even a small amount of poisoned data can install targeted misbehavior, and ostensibly benign data can transmit hidden preferences that generalize broadly.
By Adhyyan Narang, Artin Tajdini, Claire Zhang, Jamie Morgenstern
arXiv:2508. 20697v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) continue to grow in capability, so do the risks of harmful misuse through fine-tuning.
By Weitao Feng, Lixu Wang, Peizhuo Lv, Tianyi Wei, Jie Zhang, Chongyang Gao, Sinong Zhan, Wei Dong
arXiv:2608. 16622v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multimodal harmful meme detection is typically formulated as image--text harmfulness classification.
By Yujia Li, Yiqun Zhang, Zihan Cheng, Yijie Huang, Tenglong Ye, Zihan Wang, Xiaocui Yang, Shi Feng, Yifei Zhang, Daling Wang
arXiv:2508. 10029v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safety-aligned large language models can still be manipulated through white-box interventions that modify their internal representations.
By Wenpeng Xing, Bohan Yang, Mohan Li, Chunqiang Hu, Haitao Xu, Ningyu Zhang, Bo Lin, Meng Han
arXiv:2602. 04899v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We present a data poisoning attack -- Phantom Transfer -- with the property that, even if you know precisely how the poison was placed into an otherwise benign dataset, you cannot filter it out.
By Andrew Draganov, Tolga H. Dur, Anandmayi Bhongade, Mary Phuong
The paper examines how synthetic data can be used to covertly inject targeted social biases into aligned large language models. By having a misaligned teacher model generate filtered synthetic datasets in domains like creative writing and code generation, the authors fine‑tune aligned student models and demonstrate that the benign‑looking data can transmit biases while preserving general task performance. The study highlights a security risk in synthetic data‑driven LLM training pipelines and proposes log‑linearity‑based scoring as a potential safeguard.
By Minkyung Cho, Jihyo Kim, SeungWoo Song, Junghun Yuk, Minjoon Kee, Hoyun Song, KyungTae Lim
arXiv:2506.07356v3 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: While Finetuning-as-a-Service (FaaS) enables customization of Large Language Models (LLMs) using user data, this service is vulnerable to safety de...
By Seokil Ham, Yubin Choi, Yujin Yang, Seungju Cho, Younghun Kim, Changick Kim
arXiv:2606. 05290v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Recent progress in generative modeling has made safety control a central challenge, yet existing approaches remain largely model-specific, requiring retraining or tailored interventions for each new architecture.
By Tobia Poppi, Silvia Cappelletti, Sara Sarto, Florian Schiffers, Garin Kessler, Marcella Cornia, Lorenzo Baraldi, Rita Cucchiara
arXiv:2606. 16808v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: While Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) excel at complex tasks, they remain highly vulnerable to sophisticated jailbreaks and direct harmful queries.
By Ke Miao, Jiaxin Li, Hongliang Chen, Yuke Hu, Zhan Qin
arXiv:2606. 02947v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Supervised fine-tuning is the predominant approach for adapting autoregressive vision-language models to downstream tasks.
By Ivan Saboli\'c, Marin Or\v{s}i\'c, Josip \v{S}ari\'c, Sven Lon\v{c}ari\'c
The community has recently developed various training-time defenses to counter neural backdoors introduced through data poisoning. In light of the observation that a model learns poisonous samples responsible for the backdoor easier than benign samples, these approaches either use a fixed threshold of the training loss for splitting or iteratively learn a reference model as an oracle for identifying benign samples.
arXiv:2607. 05748v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The community has recently developed various training-time defenses to counter neural backdoors introduced through data poisoning.
By Qi Zhao, Christian Wressnegger