arXiv:2602. 04899v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We present a data poisoning attack -- Phantom Transfer -- with the property that, even if you know precisely how the poison was placed into an otherwise benign dataset, you cannot filter it out.
Summary generated by The Flow from the publisher's feed. The full article lives at arXiv AI.
arXiv:2605. 26595v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are often fine-tuned on uncurated text datasets that adversaries can poison.
arXiv:2607. 05516v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Model-specific adversarial attacks have been extensively studied.
The community has recently developed various training-time defenses to counter neural backdoors introduced through data poisoning. In light of the observation that a model learns poisonous samples responsible for the backdoor easier than benign samples, these approaches either use a fixed threshold of the training loss for splitting or iteratively learn a reference model as an oracle for identifying benign samples.
arXiv:2607. 23394v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Recent work shows that fine-tuning language models on even a small amount of poisoned data can install targeted misbehavior, and ostensibly benign data can transmit hidden preferences that generalize broadly.
Model-specific adversarial attacks have been extensively studied. We study a different failure mode: naturally occurring statistical signals in vision data that can behave like backdoor-like triggers without being maliciously inserted.
arXiv:2606. 08372v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Synthetic data is increasingly promoted as a privacy-preserving substitute for releasing sensitive tabular records, yet its central adversarial threat ("reconstruction", the recovery of an individual's hidden attribute values from a synthetic release and a handful of known quasi-identifiers) has been studied only in scattered, hard-to-compare settings.