The paper introduces Persona‑Execution Separation (PES), an architecture pattern that splits an LLM agent’s persona—its instructions, tone, and self‑presentation—from its execution—stateful, auditable work—by placing them in distinct trust domains linked through a governed contract bridge. PES allows the persona to evolve freely while keeping execution traceable, using mechanisms such as an approval matrix, data‑loss‑prevention exceptions, and continuous identity. A pilot implementation on a regulated digital‑employee platform demonstrated that PES successfully decouples persona drift from execution audit, preventing re‑validation or fingerprinting of hard‑asserted fields.
arXiv:2607. 08028v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Enterprise large language model (LLM) applications often begin as prototypes whose behavior is carried by prompts and retrieval context.
arXiv:2609.00546v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agent systems are commonly described by the model and harness that currently produce their behavior. That boundary is useful for one execution but un...
arXiv:2607. 10487v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM agents can commit durable effects from authority evidence that was valid earlier in execution: a DOM snapshot, approval epoch, version witness, branch token, or worker result.
ClawSentry is an open‑source, framework‑agnostic security supervision gateway designed to protect autonomous large language model (LLM) agents from progressive risks that can arise at four points in the agent control loop: skill admission, invocation‑time intent, execution‑time effect, and post‑action consequence. It introduces a multi‑tier decision engine—deterministic L1, rule‑anchored L2, and read‑only L3—alongside a First‑Use Skill Package Review (FSPR) and an Agent Harness Protocol (AHP) that applies a single policy across multiple agent runtimes without modifying their internals. Evaluation on SkillInject and the SkillsSafety benchmark shows that ClawSentry significantly reduces contextual adversarial skill risk (ASR) while maintaining high task success rates (TSR).
The paper introduces a framework for evaluating how large language model agents revise their success criteria after failures, defining five non‑compensatory conditions that must be met for a criterion revision to be considered valid. Using the CMB‑0.1 protocol, the authors test twelve cross‑domain scenarios across four system configurations, finding that no model trial satisfies all five conditions and highlighting specific failure modes such as zero‑state reconstruction and inadequate intervention sensitivity. They propose a more stringent trace‑anchored CMB‑0.4 protocol to better isolate and measure criterion revision in future studies.
arXiv:2607. 05397v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agent systems increasingly execute rather than advise.
The paper reports a failure study of a production agentic software‑delivery platform, analyzing 147 incidents across 81 runs. It shows that the standard reliability primitives—retry, timeout, and error‑rate circuit breaking—fail in practice, leading to costly loops, false trips, and blocked work. The authors identify two cross‑cutting causes—identity adequacy and evidence adequacy—and propose seven new reliability primitives that enforce reliability at the delegation level.
arXiv:2607. 25364v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Tool-using agents expose structured calls but commonly attach free-form rationales.
arXiv:2608. 07952v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-augmented LLM agents can harbor implicit state that persists across sessions, activates through events, and propagates across agent boundaries---largely invisible to standard debugging.
arXiv:2608.30091v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Modern agent frameworks compose planners, tool agents, remote services, and shared specialists into runtime delegation graphs, but their revocation API...
arXiv:2606. 12320v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Enterprise security was built to govern data boundaries: the protected surface was data at rest and in transit, and the controls -- access control, data-loss prevention, perimeter inspection -- governed crossings of that boundary.
arXiv:2608. 04066v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: How do you verify a long-horizon agent when its own state and self-reports are exactly what you cannot trust?