Improving instruction hierarchy in frontier LLMs
IH-Challenge trains models to prioritize trusted instructions, improving instruction hierarchy, safety steerability, and resistance to prompt injection attacks.
Today's LLMs are susceptible to prompt injections, jailbreaks, and other attacks that allow adversaries to overwrite a model's original instructions with their own malicious prompts.
IH-Challenge trains models to prioritize trusted instructions, improving instruction hierarchy, safety steerability, and resistance to prompt injection attacks.
arXiv:2606. 00150v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As Large Language Models evolve for user convenience, vulnerability to jailbreak attacks continues to be reported despite ongoing efforts in safety training.
arXiv:2606. 03090v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has significantly accelerated recent research on LLM-based automatic grading (AG) systems.
arXiv:2512. 14751v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Finetuning pretrained large language models (LLMs) has become the standard paradigm for developing downstream applications.
arXiv:2602. 14211v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Agent skills extend LLM agents with task-specific instructions, executable scripts, and auxiliary resources, improving reusability but creating a new supply-chain attack surface.
arXiv:2605. 08442v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We discover that prompt-injection success and tool-execution success are separable safety properties: defenses that block injection do not necessarily block execution, and vice versa.
arXiv:2606. 05396v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Producing a labeled vulnerable code at scale is a recurring obstacle for learning-based vulnerability detection: mined corpora carry substantial label noise, and existing LLM-based augmentation propagates these inaccuracies because it transforms vulnerable seeds rather than synthesising vulnerabilities from a specification.
As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time. We ask whether a defender can recover such a trigger under realistic affordances, namely white-box access to the weights and knowledge of the behavior of concern, but no training data, no trusted reference model, no knowledge of the trigger, and no certainty that the model is poisoned.
arXiv:2601. 21233v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Autonomous code agents built on large language models are reshaping software and AI development through tool use, long-horizon reasoning, and self-directed interaction.
arXiv:2605. 26595v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are often fine-tuned on uncurated text datasets that adversaries can poison.
arXiv:2607. 00481v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Jailbreak attacks remain a critical threat to the safe deployment of large language models (LLMs).
arXiv:2607. 18622v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Textual Collaborative Prompt Optimization (TCPO) extends Textgrad (Yuksekgonul et al.