arXiv:2607. 06595v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Personal AI agents powered by large language models can reason and act using available tools to access emails, manage calendars, and push code to remote repositories, all with minimal oversight.
arXiv:2607. 05189v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Persistent personal agents combine long-term memory with access to users' external environments, enabling personalized foreground assistance and proactive background execution.
arXiv:2606. 10742v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: External memory has become a core component of modern web agents, enabling long-horizon reasoning through the retrieval of past experiences.
arXiv:2512. 23128v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Web-based agents powered by large language models are increasingly used for tasks such as email management or professional networking.
arXiv:2606. 02643v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG)-enhanced LLM systems, while powerful, introduce substantial inference costs due to the inclusion of an extra multi-stage pipeline that dynamically retrieves and synthesizes information from external knowledge sources.
arXiv:2602. 09222v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) based web agents are increasingly deployed to automate complex online tasks by directly interacting with web sites and performing actions on users' behalf.
The paper introduces a unified framework for monitoring misuse of large language model agents in multi‑actor settings, focusing on two attack types: decomposition attacks and prompt injection attacks. It proposes tracking the agent’s externalised actions and determining whether the first detection of harm falls within a defined harm window. Using this formalism, the authors build a benchmark of about 6,200 conversation transcripts and evaluate 17 monitor configurations, finding that action‑framed monitors perform well on both threats while content‑framed monitors struggle with injection attacks, and highlighting limitations of traditional position‑blind metrics.
Repeat-After-Me is a black-box adaptive visual prompt injection technique that can reveal personally identifiable information or trigger malicious tool calls in both open-weight and commercial vision‑language models, achieving attack success rates above 80% on Qwen3.6‑27B and 47% on GPT‑5.5. The method works even when the benign user prompt is unrelated to the injected task and does not explicitly authorize it, and it retains significant effectiveness when transferred across models or optimized on surrogate systems. In a real‑world OpenClaw Discord deployment, a minimally injected image can overwrite TOOLS.md, enabling remote code execution and secret exfiltration.
arXiv:2605.01970v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Memory systems enable otherwise stateless LLM agents to persist user information across sessions, but also introduce a new attack surface. Th...
arXiv:2406.00083v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) enhances Large Language Models (LLMs) by retrieving relevant information from external knowledge bases t...
arXiv:2606. 15609v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on long-term memory to support complex task execution, user personalization, and domain adaptation.
arXiv:2607. 05029v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Persistent memory has enabled large language model (LLM) agents to store factual knowledge, prior decisions, reasoning histories, tool usage information, and context.