AI systems are increasingly involved in decisions and actions that may later require investigation. When an AI related incident occurs, investigators need to reconstruct what the system did, why it behaved that way, and which part of the system or supply chain contributed to the outcome.
arXiv:2608. 03520v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI systems are increasingly involved in decisions and actions that may later require investigation.
arXiv:2608.22512v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Autonomous multi-agent systems nowadays act in finance, software supply chains, and security operations. Already, the first largely AI-orchestrated int...
arXiv:2607. 05428v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We present Charlie, an on-premise multi-agent Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) system for structured evidential processing in digital forensic environments.
The paper discusses the need to adapt incident reporting frameworks for AI agents, which are rapidly deployed and face unique security challenges. By comparing AI systems and agents and consulting 23 experts, the authors identify key reporting elements such as agent memory, autonomy levels, and tool usage. They also highlight open research questions, potential reporting weaknesses like data leakage, and outline privacy requirements for secure AI agent deployment.
arXiv:2608. 11274v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The dominant paradigm treats AI safety as a property to be instilled during model training via RLHF, DPO, or Constitutional AI.
AI agents increasingly act through tools and delegated authority, but general incident repositories rarely capture the mechanisms needed to compare public failures with agent-security evaluations. We...
arXiv:2607. 19292v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Current AI safety discourse still focuses disproportionately on visible failures, including obvious harms, dramatic misuse, and hypothetical catastrophic scenarios.
The article discusses the evolution of AI across three generations—from explicit logic to neural networks to large language models (LLMs)—and how LLMs introduce new systemic risks. It applies a forensic‑psychology profiling method to identify ten key features of LLMs, such as hallucinations, bias, and cognitive atrophy, revealing an entity that confabulates, amplifies user biases, and erodes human competence. The report concludes with a four‑pillar framework for AI resilience, emphasizing cognitive sovereignty, measurable control, partial autonomy, and openness to safeguard society.
arXiv:2606. 04990v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM)-based agents increasingly solve complex tasks by interacting with external tools, retrieval systems, memory modules, environments, and other agents.
arXiv:2608. 13867v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI coding agents are commonly evaluated as models but deployed as systems.
arXiv:2410. 22526v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: To effectively address potential harms from Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems, it is essential to identify and mitigate system-level hazards.
arXiv:2606. 29437v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The growing use of Large Language Models (LLMs) in education, software engineering, academic writing, and technical documentation raises a key question: how can we evaluate not only AI-assisted outputs, but also the interaction process that produced them?