arXiv:2606. 02630v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Patient-facing medical chatbots are commonly evaluated on single-turn prompts, yet real users push back after refusals, add urgency, and invoke authority.
arXiv:2609.36849v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety-aligned language models are commonly deployed as multi-turn assistants, which lets adversaries spread unsafe intent across several user turns...
arXiv:2608. 15594v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Multi-turn jailbreak attacks have emerged as a critical safety threat to LLMs, as harmful objectives are decomposed across a sequence of apparently benign turns to bypass guardrails.
arXiv:2603. 24511v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We show that AI agents are capable of discovering novel algorithms for adversarial attacks against LLMs, advancing the state of the art on white-box jailbreaking and prompt injection evaluations.
The paper introduces ADVERSA, an automated red‑teaming framework that evaluates large language model safety over multiple turns by tracking continuous compliance trajectories instead of binary jailbreak outcomes. Using a fine‑tuned 70B attacker model and a structured 5‑point rubric, the authors conduct controlled experiments on three frontier victim models, measuring guardrail degradation and judge reliability through a triple‑judge consensus. Results show a 26.7% jailbreak rate with most breaches occurring early, and the study documents inter‑judge agreement, attacker drift, and attacker refusals as key factors affecting safety assessment.
arXiv:2606. 01738v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multi-turn jailbreak attacks pose a growing threat to LLMs by exploiting conversational dynamics such as gradual escalation and cross-turn coordination.
arXiv:2607. 13411v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Clinical AI models can expose patients to harm when adversarial vulnerabilities go undetected, yet formal security auditing requires statistical expertise, specialized tools, and significant time.
arXiv:2510. 17947v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are improving at an exceptional rate.
arXiv:2608. 20820v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to multi-turn jailbreak attacks that progressively manipulate conversation context.
The paper investigates how conversational safety in language models degrades over extended, adversarial interactions. By testing three instruction‑tuned models with persistent adversarial users across up to 101 turns, the study finds that safe‑response rates drop sharply from 85–100% at the first turn to 15–44% by the end. This demonstrates that strong single‑turn safety does not guarantee continued safety in long conversations.
arXiv:2503. 15560v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly vulnerable to sophisticated multi-turn manipulation attacks, where adversaries strategically build context through seemingly benign conversational turns to circumvent safety measures and elicit harmful or unauthorized responses.
arXiv:2606. 16751v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across a wide range of tasks.
arXiv:2606. 20470v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic AI systems increasingly rely on language-model components to interpret instructions, process external data, invoke tools, and coordinate with other agents.