arXiv:2607. 21401v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A vision-language AI assistant returns its answer as a stream of generated tokens.
arXiv:2606. 26686v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In order to screen a prompt or a response, the recent guardrail methods generate a chain-of-thought (CoT) before they issue a verdict.
arXiv:2607. 17786v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Does adding a reasoning step make a Vision-Language-Action (VLA) model more robust to perturbation?
Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed in consumer, medical, financial, and enterprise applications. This broad deployment expands the safety surface: risks can arise from multimodal question answering, assistant responses, and cross-modal composition, while moderation policies may vary across products, regions, and deployment stages.
arXiv:2607. 12815v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting is widely used as a test-time scaling strategy for Vision-Language Models (VLMs), but it remains unclear what is extended when VLMs generate longer reasoning traces.
arXiv:2608. 04510v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Diffusion-based vision-language-action (VLA) policies can generate plausible actions even when their predictions are weakly grounded in the visual and language evidence defining the task.
arXiv:2607. 26574v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safety classifiers ("guards") are the dominant black-box defense for vision-language models, yet a guard judges an input's surface form, not its meaning: a harmful request re-encoded as set theory, formal logic, a classical language, code, or text rendered inside an image slips past a guard that would block it in plain language - the decode gap.
Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting is widely used as a test-time scaling strategy for Vision-Language Models (VLMs), but it remains unclear what is extended when VLMs generate longer reasoning traces. We ask whether CoT requires continued access to image tokens, or whether it mainly operates over visual information already made available earlier in the forward pass.
arXiv:2607. 09697v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Existing safety mechanisms for multimodal large language models (MLLMs) face a fundamental trade-off between safety and utility.
arXiv:2607. 26574v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety classifiers ("guards") are the dominant black-box defense for vision-language models, yet they judge an input's surface form, not its meaning: a harmful request re-encoded as set theory, formal logic, a rare language, code, or an image of text slips past a guard that would block it in plain language -- the decode gap.
arXiv:2607. 05910v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Image guardrails are typically trained and evaluated under a fixed safety policy, implicitly treating safety as an intrinsic property of an image.
arXiv:2608. 15673v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model guardrails can be viewed as policy-consistency problems: a system must determine which policy-relevant facts hold in a prompt-response pair and what those facts imply under a given policy.
arXiv:2606. 28397v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Vision-language navigation (VLN) has recently advanced with large language and multimodal models, enabling agents to follow natural-language instructions in unseen environments without training a task-specific navigation policy.