arXiv:2609. 20353v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study repeated contract design when a principal observes outcomes but not the actions that generate them.
arXiv:2507. 09473v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study the dynamic allocation of indivisible resources to strategic agents under long-term constraints, where the planner aims to maximize social welfare, satisfy multiple constraints, and elicit near-truthful reports.
arXiv:2503. 01701v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Most microeconomic models of interest involve optimizing a piecewise linear function.
arXiv:2503. 07869v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Critical learning periods (CLPs) in federated learning (FL) refer to early stages during which low-quality contributions (e.
arXiv:2601. 01496v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: In this paper, we settle the problem of learning optimal linear contracts from data in the offline setting, where agent types are drawn from an unknown distribution and the principal's goal is to design a contract that maximizes her expected utility.
arXiv:2607. 10963v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study the problem of efficient online proportional sampling from a high-dimensional domain under a $\sigma$-smoothed adversary, where the sampling distribution is induced by a dynamically evolving weight function defined over a sequence of piecewise-structured partitions.
arXiv:2609.38375v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Can a constant number of linear minimizations per round improve on the $T^{3/4}$ regret rate of online Frank-Wolfe on general convex sets? Weibel et al...
arXiv:2607. 02196v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study online resource allocation when both rewards and consumption sizes may be continuously distributed.
arXiv:2602.04125v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Modern digital platforms use contextual bandits to allocate valuable exposure and opportunities among competing participants. Fair treatment...
arXiv:2607. 05813v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study repeated contextual procurement auctions in which the platform must learn context-dependent product values from bandit feedback.
arXiv:2607. 23432v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Decision-makers in learning environments face a dilemma when their short-term optimal actions may not favor their long-term benefits the most.
arXiv:2608. 10526v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Motivated by decentralized applications, we study cooperative multi-agent bandits in continuous (Lipschitz) action spaces when the Lipschitz constant is unknown.
This paper studies additive regret in the multi-secretary problem, defined as the gap between the expected offline prophet reward and the reward of the best online policy. Prior work established \(O(\log T)\) regret for bounded-density distributions with connected support and \(O((\log T)^2)\) upper bounds for bounded-density distributions with support gaps.