Hugging Face Trending Papers

Poison-then-Hide: Finetuning-Activated Backdoor Attack on Pretrained Vision Encoders

The paper introduces Poison-then-Hide, a finetuning-activated backdoor attack that implants a dormant backdoor into a pretrained vision encoder and activates it during full-model finetuning on clean data. The method combines trigger optimization, base encoder poisoning, and targeted unlearning to conceal the backdoor, achieving up to 97% success across six datasets and three architectures. The study shows that standard detection and mitigation defenses are ineffective, as the backdoor can reemerge after benign finetuning.

arXiv Computer Vision
Sep 4

Beyond Small Patches: Black-Box Detection and Purification of Diverse Backdoor Triggers

The paper introduces TRIM, a black‑box defense for backdoor attacks in computer vision models. TRIM identifies and removes malicious trigger regions at inference time using region‑based segmentation, adaptive trigger discovery via inpainting and diffusion, and selective purification, without needing model internals, training data, or clean samples. Experiments on various datasets and trigger types show TRIM reduces attack success rates to as low as 1.16% while maintaining high clean accuracy.

By Ahmed Abdelnaby, Mohamed Elmahallawy
arXiv Computer Vision
Aug 28

Checkerboard: Closed-Form and Data-Independent Trigger Design for Clean-Label Backdoor Attacks

The paper introduces Checkerboard, a clean‑label backdoor attack that uses a closed‑form, data‑independent trigger design based on an input‑space Fisher‑separability objective and a ridge four‑neighbor local‑smoothness prior. This approach yields a pixel‑wise checkerboard trigger without requiring data access, surrogate model training, or iterative optimization, and it outperforms existing norm‑bounded clean‑label attacks across four benchmark datasets. On CIFAR‑10, poisoning 20 samples with a 10/255 perturbation achieves a 95.72% attack success rate, while on IN‑100 a 0.4% global poisoning rate yields over 83% ASR without harming clean accuracy, and the attack remains robust against state‑of‑the‑art defenses.

By Yi Yang, Jinyang Huang, Binbin Liu, Feng-Qi Cui, Xiaokang Zhou, Haiming Jin, Zhi Liu, Jie Zhang, Meng Li